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RACIST SPEECH, DEMOCRACY, AND THE
FIRST AMENDMENT
ROBERT C. POST*
The curse of racism continues to haunt the Nation. Everywhere
we face its devastation, the bitter legacy of, in William Lloyd
Garrison's prophetic words, our "covenant with death and ...
agreement with Hell."' This is the living consequence of the
history that has produced us. We cannot overcome that history
without changing ourselves and therefore also our legal order.
Since Brown v. Board of Education2 vast stretches of our law
have passed through the flame of this challenge.3 The question
is always what to preserve, what to alter.
Now it is the turn of the first amendment. Largely inspired
by Richard Delgado's article, Words That Wound,4 the past few
years have witnessed an extraordinary spate of articles analyzing
the constitutionality of restrictions on racist speech. 5 This anal-
* Professor of Law, School of Law (Boalt Hall), University of California at Berkeley.
B.A., Harvard College, 1969; J.D., Yale University, 1977; Ph.D., Harvard University, 1980.
I am deeply indebted to the many friends and colleagues who read the manuscript of
this essay: Alexander Aleinikoff, Richard Delgado, Melvin Eisenberg, Cynthia Fuchs
Epstein, Bryan Ford, Angela Harris, Sanford Kadish, Kenneth Karst, Mari Matsuda,
Frank Michelman, Martha Minow, Paul Mishkin, Rachel Moran, John Powell, Terrance
Sandalow, Joseph Sax, Philip Selznick, Reva Siegel, Jerome Skolnick, Jan Vetter, James
Weinstein, and Franklin Zimring.
1. D. DUMOND, ANTISLAVERY: THE CRUSADE FOR FREEDOM IN AMERICA 273 (1961) (quoting
William Lloyd Garrison).
2. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
3. For a representative discussion, see Fiss, Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV.
L. REV. 1 (1979).
4. Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name-
Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133 (1982) [hereinafter Delgado, Words That Wound];
see Heins, Banning Words: A Comment on "Words That Wound," 18 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 585 (1983); Delgado, Professor Delgado Replies, 18 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 593 (1983).
5. Delgado, Campus Antiracism Rules: Constitutional Narratives in Collision, 85 Nw.
U.L. REV. 343 (1990); Gale, On Curbing Racial Speech, RESPONSIVE COMMUNITY, Winter
1990-91, at 47; Glass, Anti-Racism and Unlimited Freedom of Speech: An Untenable Dualism,
8 CAN. J. PHIL. 559 (1978Y Grano, Free Speech v. the University of Michigan, ACADEMIC
QUESTIONS, Spring 1990, at 7; Greenawalt, Insults and Epithets: Are They Protected Speech?,
42 RUTGERS L. REV. 287 (1991); Grey, Civil Rights vs. Civil Liberties: The Case of
Discriminatory Verbal Harassment, Soc. PHIL. & POL'Y, Spring 1991, at 81; Hughes,
Prohibiting Incitement to Racial Discrimination, 16 U. TORONTO L.J. 361 (1966); Jones,
Article 4 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination and the First Amendment, 23 How. L.J. 429 (1980); Kretzmer, Freedom of
Speech and Racism, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 445 (1987); Language as Violence v. Freedom of
Expression: Canadian and American Perspectives on Group Defamation, 37 BUFFALO L.
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ysis is not merely academic. Motivated by an alarming increase
in racist incidents,6 universities throughout the Nation have turned
toward the task of restraining racist expression.7 The justification
for these restraints, and their relationship to first amendment
values, has become a matter of intense controversy. 8
One approach has been to attempt to use legal regulation to
eradicate all visible signs of that "racist sentiment" which, in the
view of some, our history has caused to "pervade[] the life of
virtually all white Americans."9 The rules of the University of
REv. 337 (1989) [hereinafter Language as Violence]; Lasson, Racial Defamation as Free
Speech: Abusing the First Amendment, 17 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 11 (1985) [hereinafter
Lasson, Racial Defamation]; Lasson, Group Libel Versus Free Speech: When Big Brother
Should Butt In, 23 DuQ. L. REV. 77 (1984) [hereinafter Lasson, Group Libel]; Lawrence, If
He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431; Love,
Discriminatory Speech and the Tort of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, 47
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 123 (1990); Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering
the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320 (1989); Minow, On Neutrality, Equality, &
Tolerance: New Norms for a Decade of Distinction, CHANGE, Jan-Feb. 1990, at 17; Partlett,
From Red Lion Square to Skokie to the Fatal Shore: Racial Defamation and Freedom of
Speech, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 431 (1989); Richardson, Racism: A Tort of Outrage, 61
OR. L. REV. 267 (1982); Smolla, Rethinking First Amendment Assumptions About Racist
and Sexist Speech, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 171 (1990); Strossen, Regulating Racist Speech
on Campus: A Modest Proposal, 1990 DUKE L.J. 484; Wedgwood, Freedom of Expression
and Racial Speech, 8 TEL AvIv U. STUD. L. 325 (1988); Wright, Racist Speech and the First
Amendment, 9 Miss. C. L. REV. 1 (1988); Note, A Communitarian Defense of Group Libel
Laws, 101 HARV. L. REV. 682 (1988); Note, The University of California Hate Speech Policy:
A Good Heart in Ill-Fitting Garb, 12 J. CoMM. & ENT. L. 593 (1990); Comment, Freedom
From Fear, 15 LINCOLN L. REV. 45 (1984) (authored by Kammy Au); Edelman, Punishing
Perpetrators of Racist Speech, Legal Times, May 15, 1989, at 20.
6. See, e.g., H. EHRLICH, CAMPUS ETHNOVIOLENCE AND THE POLICY OPTIONS 41-72 (1990);
Gibbs, Bigots in the Ivory Tower: An Alarming Rise in Hatred Roils U.S. Cahzpuses, TIME,
May 7, 1990, at 104.
7. David Rieff writes that 137 American universities "have in the past two years
passed proscriptions on hate speech." Rieff, The Case Against Sensitivity, 114 ESQUIRE
120, 124 (1990). See Lessons From Bigotry 101, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 25, 1989, at 48; Wilson,
Colleges' Anti-Harassment Policies Bring Controversy Over Free-Speech Issues, Chronicle
of Higher Educ., Oct. 4, 1989, at Al; Fields, Colleges Advised to Develop Strong Procedures
to Deal With Incidents of Racial Harassment, Chronicle of Higher Educ., July 20, 1988,
at All.
8. For a chronicle of the effect of this controversy on the American Civil Liberties
Union (ACLU), see Hentoff, The Colleges: Fear, Loathing, and Suppression, Village Voice,
May 8, 1990, at 20; Hentoff, What's Happening to the ACLU?, Village Voice, May 15, 1990,
at 20; Hentoff, Putting the First Amendment on Trial, Village Voice, May 22, 1990, at 24;
Hentoff, A Dissonant First Amendment Fugue, Village Voice, June 5, 1990, at 16; Hentoff,
An Endangered Species: A First Amendment Absolutist, Village Voice, June 12, 1990, at
24; Hentoff, The Civil Liberties Shootout, Village Voice, June 19, 1990, at 26; Policy
Concerning Racist and Other Group-Based Harassment on College Campuses, ACLU NEWSL.,
Aug.-Sept. 1990, at 2.
9. J. KOVEL, WHITE RACISM: A PSYCHOHISTORY 34 (1970); see Lawrence, The Id, the Ego,
and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 321-26
(1987).
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Connecticut, for example, plainly evince this remarkable ambition.
These rules prohibit "[b]ehavior that denigrates others because
of their race [or] ethnicity."10 They provide that the "use of
derogatory names, inappropriately directed laughter, inconsider-
ate jokes, anonymous notes or phone calls, and conspicuous ex-
clusion from conversations and/or classroom discussions are
examples of harassing behaviors that are prohibited."" The rules
list the "signs" of proscribed "Harassment, Discrimination and
Intolerance," some of which are
Stereotyping the experiences, background, and skills of indi-
viduals
Treating people differently solely because they are in some
way different from the majority
Responding to behaviors or situations negatively because of
the background of the participants . . .
Imitating stereotypes in speech or mannerisms . . .
Attributing objections to any of the above actions to "hyper-
sensitivity" of the targeted individual or group.12
These rules are plainly not designed to regulate specific forms
of behavior or expression, but rather to encompass and to forbid
all exterior "signs" of an interior frame of mind. One can readily
understand the logic of this purpose. If our "common historical
and cultural heritage" has made us "all racists,"'13 then racism
must be seen as an unredeemed form of identity, whose every
manifestation ought to be challenged and sanctioned. Punitive
legal regulations are thus faced with the task of attempting to
imagine and specify every possible indication of racism. But
because the racist personality can express itself in an infinite
10. Department of Student Affairs, University of Connecticut, Protect Campus Plural-
ism (available from the Dean of Students Office, University of Connecticut). The regula-
tions provide that "[elvery member of the University is obligated to refrain from actions
that intimidate, humiliate, or demean persons or groups or that undermine their security
or self-esteem." They define "harassment" as "abusive behavior directed toward an
individual or group because of race, ethnicity, ancestry, national origin, religion, gender,
sexual preference, age, physical or mental disabilities," and they prohibit "harassment
that has the effect of interfering with an individual's performance or creating an intimi-
dating, hostile or offensive environment." Id.
11. Id. The regulations continue: "All members of the University community are
responsible for the maintenance of a positive environment in which everyone feels
comfortable working and learning." Id.
12. Id The regulations instruct a student to inform the "Discrimination and Intolerance
Response Network" if "[y]ou have experienced or witnessed any of the signs" and to
"[k]now that the University will not tolerate such behavior." Id.
13. Lawrence, supra note 9, at 322.
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variety of ways, the task is intrinsically elusive. The University
of Connecticut rules are clearly caught up in the frustrating
spiral of this logic, a logic that, when carried to its conclusion,
can end only in the complete legal subjugation of the individual.14
The incompatibility of this logic with even the most elementary
standards of freedom of speech is obvious. Any communication
can potentially express the racist self, and thus no communication
can ever be safe from legal sanction. It is therefore no surprise
that the University of Connecticut was forced to withdraw its
regulations, although apparently with reluctance and distress,
because of a threatened lawsuit.15 If the ambition of legal regu-
lation is to suppress manifestations of racist personality, the
necessary consequence will be the wholesale abandonment of all
principles of freedom of expression.
To the extent that we care about first amendment values,
therefore, we must make do with more modest aspirations. 16 The
possibility of effecting a reconciliation between principles of free-
dom of expression and restraints on racist speech depends upon
deflecting our focus away from its spontaneous target, which is
the racism of our cultural inheritance, and toward the redress of
particular and distinct harms caused by racist expression. The
specification of these harms will lead to the definition of discrete
forms of speech, the legal regulation of which can then be as-
sessed in light of relevant first amendment values.
14. One is reminded of the escalating efforts of the Inquisition in sixteenth-century
Spain to discover and punish all external signs of inward backsliding on the part of
Moors and Jews who had outwardly converted to Catholicism in order to avoid expulsion.
These efforts eventually led the Inquisition to conclude that eating couscous or disliking
pork were themselves punishable as heresy. See Root, Speaking Christian: Orthodoxy and
Difference in Sixteenth-Century Spain, REPRESENTATIONS, Summer 1988, at 118, 126, 129.
15. Ravo, Campus Slur Alters a Code Against Bias, N.Y. Times, Dec. 11, 1989, at B1,
B3.
16. Modest aspirations, however, will not be easy in the highly charged atmosphere of
many universities. See Detlefsen, White Like Me, NEW REPUB., Apr. 10, 1989, at 18. The
University of Connecticut is hardly unique in its use of punitive legal regulation to block
all manifestations of racism. The Board of Regents of Higher Education of the Common-
wealth of Massachusetts, for example, adopted on June 13, 1989 a "Policy Against Racism"
that "prohibits all forms of racism." Board of Regents of Higher Education, Commonwealth
of Massachusetts, Policy Against Racism and Guidelines for Campus Policies Against
Racism 1 (June 13, 1989). This prohibition includes:
all conditions and all actions or omissions including all acts of verbal harass-
ment or abuse which deny or have the effect of denying to anyone his or
her rights to equality, dignity, and security on the basis of his or her race,
color, ethnicity, culture, or religion . . .
Racism in any form, expressed or implied, intentional or inadvertent,
individual or institutional, constitutes an egregious offense to the tenets of
human dignity and to the accords of civility guaranteed by law.
Id. at 2.
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Such, in any event, will be the strategy of this essay. Its
ambition is to be illustrative rather than comprehensive: the
general issue of racist speech simply has too many facets to be
encompassed by the small scope of this study. Although Part I
attempts to isolate and describe five specific kinds of harm said
to be caused by racist speech, Part II offers an account of only
one of several possible relevant and important first anendment
values, that of democratic self-governance. In my view this value
is primarily responsible for the constitutional safeguards that
currently protect public discourse. The major part of this essay,
Part III, therefore addresses the narrow issue of the constitu-
tionality of regulating public discourse to ameliorate specific
harms caused by racist speech. Part IV then briefly compares
the quite different constitutional issues posed by the regulation
of racist speech within public institutions of higher learning.
One significant drawback of this analytic structure is that it
renders the term "racist speech" into something of a cipher. As
the University of Connecticut regulations illustrate, the term is
inherently labile and ambiguous. It probably has as many differ-
ent definitions as there are commentators, and it would be
pointless to pursue its endlessly variegated shades of meaning.
I have decided, therefore, to focus instead on the constitutional
implications of specific justifications for restraining racist ex-
pression, and to let the term "racist speech" absorb the content
implied by these various justifications.
I should add that writing this essay has been difficult and
painful. I am committed both to principles of freedom of expres-
sion and to the fight against racism. The topic Under consideration
has forced me to set one aspiration against the other, which I
can do only with reluctance and a heavy heart.
I. THE HARMS OF RACIST SPEECH
Even a brief survey of the contemporary debate reveals it to
be rich with textured and complex characterizations of the harms
of racist expression. It would be impossible within the limited
scope of this essay to disentangle and evaluate each of the many
harms suggested in this literature. It will therefore be necessary
to group these harms into five rough categories that represent
the most prominent lines of analysis and that are at the same
time convenient for first amendment analysis.17
17. These categories by no means exhaust the field. The European literature, for
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A. The Intrinsic Harm of Racist Speech
A recurring theme in the contemporary literature is that racist
expression ought to be regulated because it creates what has
been termed "deontic" harm.18 The basic point is that there is
an "elemental wrongness"' 9 to racist expression, regardless of
the presence or absence of particular empirical consequences
such as "grievous, severe psychological injury. ' 20 It is argued
that toleration for racist expression is inconsistent with respect
for "the principle of equality" 2' that is at the heart of the
fourteenth amendment. 22
The thrust of this argument is that a society committed to
ideals of social and political equality cannot remain passive: it
must issue unequivocal expressions of solidarity with vulner-
able minority groups and make positive statements affirming
its commitment to those ideals. Laws prohibiting racist speech
must be regarded as important components of such expressions
and statements.3
If the basic harm of racist expression lies in its intrinsic and
symbolic incompatibility with egalitarian ideals, then the distinct
class of communications subject to legal regulation will be defined
by reference to those ideals. If the fourteenth amendment is
thought to enshrine an antidiscrimination principle, then "any
speech (in its widest sense) which supports racial prejudice or
discrimination" 24 ought to be subject to regulation. If the relevant
ideals are thought to embody substantive racial equality, then
the relevant class of communications should be defined as speech
containing a "message . ..of racial inferiority."25
example, contains a well-developed jurisprudence of regulating racist speech based upon
the harm of potential violence. See Cotterrell, Prosecuting Incitement to Racial Hatred,
1982 PUB. L. 378; Kretzmer, supra note 5, at 456; Leopold, Incitement to Hatred-The
History of a Controversial Criminal Offense, 1977 PUB. L. 389, 391-93. I do not discuss
this category of harm because it is relatively unimportant in the American setting. I
suspect that this is largely because of the accepted dominion of the Brandenburg version
of the clear and present danger test. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447-49 (1969).
18. Wright, supra note 5, at 14-22.
19. Id. at 10.
20. Id. at 9.
21. Hughes, supra note 5, at 364.
22. Lawrence, supra note 5, at 438-49.
23. Kretzmer, supra note 5, at 456.
24. Id. at 454.
25. Matsuda, supra note 5, at 2357.
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B. Harm to Identifiable Groups
A second theme in the current debate is that racist expression
ought to be regulated because it harms those groups that are
the target. There are two basic variations on this theme. One
draws its inspiration from the tradition of group libel 26 and the
decision of the Supreme Court in Beauharnais v. Iltinoisf' On
this view speech likely to cast contempt or ridicule on identifiable
groups ought to be regulated to prevent injury to the status and
prospects of the members of those groups. A second variation
derives from the more contemporary understanding of racism as
"the structural subordination of a group based on an idea of
racial inferiority." Racist expression is viewed as especially
unacceptable because it locks in the oppression of already mar-
ginalized groups: "Racist speech is particularly harmful because
it is a mechanism of subordination, reinforcing a historical vertical
relationship."-"
If the prevention of group harm is the basis for the regulation
of communication, the definition of legally proscribed speech will
depend upon one's understanding of the nature of the group harm
at issue and the way in which communication is seen as causing
that harm. Regulation that derives from a theory of group def-
amation, for example, would tend to safeguard all groups,30
whereas regulation that derives from a theory of subordinate
groups would sanction only speech "directed against a historically
oppressed group."3' 1
C. Harm to Individuals
A third prominent theme in the contemporary literature is
that racist expression harms individuals. This theme essentially
analogizes racist expression to forms of communication that are
regulated by the dignitary torts of defamation, invasion of pri-
vacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The law
26. Riesman, Democracy and Defamation: Control of Group Libel, 42 COLUM. L. REV.
727 (1942).
27. 343 U.S. 250 (1952). For work in this vein, see Lasson, Group Libel, supra note 5;
Lasson, Racial Defamation, supra note 5; Note, Group Vilification Reconsidered, 89 YALE
L.J. 308 (1979).
28. Matsuda, supra note 5, at 2358.
29. Id.
30. See, e.g., Lasson, Racial Defamation, supra note 5, at 48.
31. Matsuda, supra note 5, at 2357.
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compensates persons for dignitary and emotional injuries caused
by such communication, and it is argued that racist expression
ought to be subject to regulation because it causes similar inju-
ries. These injuries include "feelings of humiliation, isolation, and
self-hatred,"'3 2 as well as "dignitary affront."33 The injuries are
particularly powerful because "racial insults . ..conjure up the
entire history of racial discrimination in this country." In Pa-
tricia Williams' striking phrase, racist expression is a form of
"spirit-murder." 35
Regulating racist expression because of its negative impact on
particular persons would suggest that the class of communications
subject to legal sanction be narrowed to those that are addressed
to specific individuals or that in some other way can be demon-
strated to have adversely affected specific individuals. The nature
of that class would vary, however, depending upon the particular
kind of harm sought to be redressed. If the focus is on preventing
"dignitary harm,' 36 the injury might be understood to inhere in
the very utterance of certain kinds of racist communications; 37 if
the focus is instead on emotional damage, independent proof of
distress might be required to sustain recovery.38 Regulation will
also vary depending upon whether harm to individuals is under-
stood to flow from the ideational content of racist expression, or
instead from its abusive nature.3 9
32. Delgado, Words That Wound, supra note 4, at 137.
33. Id. at 143.
34. Id. at 157.
35. Williams, Spirit-Murdering the Messenger: The Discourse of Fingerpointing as the
Law's Response to Racism, 42 U. MIAMI L. REv. 127, 151 (1987).
36. Love, supra note 5, at 158.
37. Richard Delgado, for example, proposes that courts create a tort for racial insult
whenever a plaintiff can prove that "[1]anguage was addressed to him or her by the
defendant that was intended to demean through reference to race; that the plaintiff
understood as intended to demean through reference to race; and that a reasonable
person would recognize as a racial insult." Delgado, Words That Wound, supra note 4, at
179.
38. See, for example, the proposed regulation of The University of Texas at Austin,
which prohibits racial harassment and which defines racial harassment "as extreme or
outrageous acts or communications that are intended to harass, intimidate or humiliate
a student or students on account of race, color, or national origin and that reasonably
cause them to suffer severe emotional distress." President's Ad Hoc Committee on Racial
Harassment, The University of Texas at Austin, Report of President's Ad Hoc Committee
on Racial Harassment 4-5 (Nov. 27, 1989). The drafters of the proposed regulation state
that it is "much preferable for a racial harassment policy to focus on the real injury of
severe emotional distress." Id. at 20.
39. Compare, for example, the regulations of the University of Wisconsin, which reach
"racist or discriminatory comments, epithets or other expressive behavior directed at an
RACIST SPEECH
D. Harm to the Marketplace of Ideas
A fourth theme in the current debate is that racist expression
harms the very marketplace of ideas that the first amendment
is designed to foster. A variety of different arguments have been
brought forward to support this position. It is argued that racist
expression ought to be "proscribed . ..as a form of assault, as
conduct" inconsistent with the conditions of respect and noncoer-
cion prerequisite to rational deliberation.40 It is argued that racist
expression is inconsistent with rational deliberation because it
"infects, skews, and disables the operation of the market ....
Racism is irrational and often unconscious." '41 Finally, it is argued
that racism "systematically" silences "whole segments of the
population,' 42 either through the "visceral" shock and "preemp-
tive effect on further speech" of racist words,43 or through the
distortion of "the marketplace of ideas by muting or devaluing
the speech of blacks and other non-whites.."44
The class of communications subject to legal sanction would
depend upon which of these various arguments is accepted.
Depending upon exactly how racist expression is understood to
damage the marketplace of ideas, the class might be confined to
communication experienced as coercive and shocking, or it might
be expanded to include communication perceived as unconsciously
and irrationally racist, or it might be expanded still further to
encompass speech explicitly devaluing and stigmatizing victim
groups.
E. Harm to Educational Environment
Each of the four categories of harm so far discussed can be
caused by racist expression within public discourse. There is,
individual:' Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System, Wis. Admin. Code
UWS 5 17.06(2)(a) (Aug. 1989) (currently being challenged as a violation of the first
amendment in UWM Post, Inc. v. Board of the Univ. of Wis. Sys., No. 90-C-0328 (E.D.
Wis. filed Mar. 29, 1990)), with that of Stanford University, which reaches only racist
speech that is "addressed directly to the individual or individuals whom it insults or
stigmatizes" and that consists of "insulting or 'fighting' words." Stanford University,
Fundamental Standard Interpretation: Free Expression and Discriminatory Harassment
2 (draft, Mar. 15, 1990).
40. Lasson, Group Libel, supra. note 5, at 123. "The speech clause protects the market-
place of ideas, not the battleground." Id.
41. Lawrence, supra note 5, at 468.
42. Id. at 447 n.66 (quoting MacKinnon, Not a Moral Issue, 2 YALE L. & POL'y REV.
321, 340 (1984)).
43. Id. at 452.
44. Id. at 470.
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however, yet a fifth kind of harm which is quite important to
the contemporary controversy, but which is relevant only to the
specific educational environment of institutions of higher learning.
This is the harm that racist expression is understood to cause
to the educational mission of universities or colleges. The pre-
vention of this harm is central to the definition of a great number
of campus regulations.
Universities and colleges characteristically seek to regulate
racist communications that "directly create a substantial and
immediate interference with the educational processes of the
University," without articulating exactly how racist expression
can cause that interference.45 Some campus regulations are more
specific, focusing on the damage that racist expression is under-
stood to cause to particular individuals or groups. For example,
some regulations only proscribe racist expression that "will in-
terfere with the victim's ability to pursue effectively his or her
education or otherwise to participate fully in University programs
and activities.."46 Presumably this interference will occur for rea-
sons similar to those that we have already canvassed.
In a number of instances, however, college or university reg-
ulations enunciate special educational goals that are understood
to be inherently incompatible with racist expression. For exam-
ple, Mount Holyoke seeks to inculcate the value of diversity,
which it views as plainly inconsistent with racist expression.
Accordingly Mount Holyoke's regulations provide:
45. Office of Student Life Policy and Service, Rutgers University at New Brunswick,
University Student Life Policy Against Insult, Defamation, and Harassment 1 (May 31,
1989) (revised); see also Doe v. University of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852, 856 (E.D. Mich.
1989); Oberlin College, Policy on Race Relations and Informal Procedures for Racial
Grievances; Office of the Dean for Student Affairs and the Special Assistants to the
President, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Information on Harassment (Sept. 1989);
State University of New York College at Brockport, Discriminatory Harassment § 285.02;
University of Pennsylvania, Harassment Policy (Almanac Supp., Sept. 29, 1987) (as pub-
lished originally in the Almanac of June 2, 1987).
46. University of California, Universitywide Student Conduct: Hardssment Policy (Sept.
21, 1989) (available from Office of the President). For an example of a regulation based
upon group harm, see Clark University's Code of General Conduct: "Harassment includes
any verbal or physical conduct which has the intent or effect of unreasonably interfering
with any individual's or group's work or study, or creating an intimidating, hostile, or
offensive environment." Clark University, Code of General Conduct and University Ju-
dicial Procedures 1 (Fall Semester 1988). For other examples of similar kinds of regula-
tions, see Emory University, Policy Statement on Discriminatory Harassment; Marquette
University, Racial Abuse and Harassment Policy (May 5, i989); Office of University News
and Information of Kent State University, Policy to Combat Harassment, For the Record,
Vol. 5, No. 5 (Feb. 6, 1989).
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To enter Mount Holyoke College is to become a member of a
community....
Our community is committed to maintaining an environment
in which diversity is not only tolerated, but is celebrated.
Towards this end, each member of the Mount Holyoke com-
munity is expected to treat all individuals with a common
standard of decency.47
Marquette University defines itself "as a Christian and Catholic
institution. . . dedicated to the proposition that all human beings
possess an inherent dignity in the eyes of their Creator and
equality as children of God."48 Accordingly Marquette's regula-
tions seek to maintain "an environment in which the dignity and
worth of each member of its community is respected" and in
which "racial abuse or harassment . . . will not be tolerated. 49
Mary Washington College sets forth what appears to be a secular
version of this same educational mission; its regulations provide
that the "goal of the College is to help all students achieve
academic success in an environment that nurtures, encourages
growth, and develops sensitivity and appreciation for all people."50
Accordingly "any activity or conduct that detracts from this
goal-such as racial or sexual harassment-is inconsistent with
the purposes of the college community."51
In such instances, racist expression interferes with education
not merely because of general harms that it may inflict on groups
or individuals or the marketplace of ideas, 52 but also, and more
intrinsically, because racist expression exemplifies conduct that
is contrary to the particular educational values that specific
colleges or universities seek to instill.5
47. Mount Holyoke College, The Honor Code: Academic and Community Responsibility
5 I, Community Responsibility, Introduction (reprinted from the Student Handbook).
48. Marquette University, Racial Abuse and Harassment Policy 1 (May 5, 1989).
49. Id.
50. Mary Washington College, Mary Washington College Student Handbook 20 (1990-
91) (available from Office of the Dean of Students).
51. Id.
52. "If the university stands for anything, it stands for freedom in the search for
truth. . . . [But] [clan truth have its day in court when the courtroom is made into a
mud-wrestling pit where vicious epithets are flung?" Laney, Why Tolerate Campus Bigots?,
N.Y. Times, Apr. 6, 1990, at A35.
53. Thus James T. Laney, the President of Emory University, stated:
Educators are by definition professors of value. Through education we pass
on to the next generation not merely information but the habits and manners
of our civil society. The university differs from society at large in its
insistence on not only free expression but also an environment conducive to
mutual engagement.
1991]
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II. THE VALUES OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT
As any constitutional lawyer knows, first amendment doctrine
is neither clear nor logical. It is a vast Sargasso Sea of drifting
and entangled values, theories, rules, exceptions, predilections.
It requires determined interpretive effort to derive a useful set
of constitutional principles by which to evaluate regulations of
expression. In recent years there has been an unfortunate ten-
dency, by no means limited to the controversy surrounding racist
speech, to avoid this difficult work by relying instead on formulaic
invocations of first amendment "interests" which can be captured
in such conclusory labels as "individual self-fulfillment," "truth,"
"democracy," and so forth.m These formulas cast an illusion of
stability and order over first amendment jurisprudence, an ilu-
sion that can turn dangerous when it substitutes for serious
engagement with the question of why we really care about
protecting freedom of expression.
What is most disappointing about the expanding literature
proposing restrictions on racist speech is the palpable absence
of that engagement. The most original and significant articles in
the genre concentrate on uncovering and displaying the manifold
harms of racist communications; the harms of regulating expres-
sion are on the whole perfunctorily dismissed. Of course this
emphasis is readily understandable. It is a formidable task to
attempt to carve out a new exception to the general protection
of speech afforded by the armor of first amendment doctrine.
Even so staunch a defender of minority rights as Justice William
Brennan might seem unsympathetic, given his recent observation
in United States v. Eichman5 5 that "virulent ethnic and religious
epithets"56 ought to receive constitutional protection because of
the 'bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment ...
that the Government may not prohibit the expression of an idea
simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagree-
able.' ' 57 In the face of such daunting obstacles, it is natural for
54. See, e.g., Delgado, Words That Wound, supra note 4, at 175-79; Note, A First
Amendment Justification for Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 40 CASE W. RES. 733
(1989-90).
55. 110 S. Ct. 2404 (1990).
56. Id. at 2410.
57. Id. (quoting Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533, 2544 (1989)). See Brennan's remark
in Texas v. Johnson to the same effect: "The First Amendment does not guarantee that
... concepts virtually sacred to our Nation as a whole-such as the principle that
discrimination on the basis of race is odious and destructive-will go unquestioned in the
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proponents of restraints on racist speech to emphasize their
affirmative case and to minimize countervailing considerations.
I agree, of course, that the question of regulating racist speech
ought not to be settled simply by reference to present doctrine.
But it is equally important that the question ought not to be
settled without serious engagement with the values embodied in
that doctrine. Regulations like those promulgated by the Univer-
sity of Connecticut and many other universities suggest that this
lack of engagement is a real and practical problem.58 Although
earnest inquiry into the first amendment values involved in the
restraint of racist speech cannot by itself definitively solve the
difficult constitutional issues we face, it can at least illuminate
what is most deeply at stake for us in this controversy, and to
that extent clarify the choices we must make.
A. Democracy, Public Discourse, and the First Amendment
This essay concentrates on the relevance for the regulation of
racist speech of only one strand of first amendment values. It is,
however, an extraordinarily important strand, one which in my
view accounts for a good deal of the shape of contemporary first
amendment doctrine. It concerns the relationship between free-
dom of expression and democratic self-governance. Its basic thrust
is to provide certain kinds of protection to communication deemed
necessary for the processes of democracy, communication that
the Court has labelled "public discourse."5 9
In protecting public discourse the first amendment serves the
purposes of democracy, and the question at hand is what we
believe those purposes to be. This is not a simple question. Even
so powerful a first amendment theorist as Frederick Schauer can
argue that "[a]ny distinct restraint on majority power, such as a
marketplace of ideas." Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2546. Brennan supported this remark by
citing Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969), in which the Court extended first
amendment protection to a Ku Klux Klan rally featuring such revolting comments as:
"Bury the n- -s"; "A dirty n- -r"; and "Send the Jews back to Israel." Id. at 446 n.1.
58. Charles Lawrence, for example, writes that the University of Michigan regulations
recently invalidated by a federal court, see supra note 45, were so patently unconstitu-
tional that "it is difficult to believe that anyone at the University of Michigan Law School
was consulted" in their drafting. Lawrence, supra note 5, at 477 n.161. "It is almost as
if the university purposefully wrote an unconstitutional regulation so that they could say
to the black students, 'We tried to help but the courts just won't let us do it."' Id. A
great many contemporary university regulations are similar to those of the University
of Michigan.
59. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 54 (1988).
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principle of freedom of speech, is by its nature anti-democratic,
anti-majoritarian."0 If democracy means no more to us than that
in each instance the majority ought to have its way, then of
course Schauer is quite correct that speech comprising public
discourse ought not for that reason to have any special exemption
from majoritarian regulation.6 1 But the underlying equation of
democracy with the simple exercise of majority will is radically
inadequate not only as an explanation of contours of contempo-
rary doctrine, but also as an account of the normative attraction
of democracy.62
A far more persuasive account is one that begins with
the distinction between autonomy and heteronomy: democratic
forms of government are those in which the laws are made by
the same people to whom they apply (and for that reason they
are autonomous norms), while in autocratic forms of govern-
ment the law-makers are different from those to whom the
laws are addressed (and are therefore heteronomous norms).6
This distinction between autonomy and heteronomy formed the
basis of Hans Kelsen's definition of "democracy," which he viewed
as a form of government resting on "the principle of self-deter-
mination. ' '64 The distinction is manifestly at the root of the Court's
repudiation of seditious libel in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,6 5
which turned on Madison's differentiation of American and Eng-
lish forms of government: in England "the Crown was sovereign
and the people were subjects," whereas in America "'[t]he people,
60. F. SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 40 (1982). On the equation of
democracy with majoritarianism, see A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 254 (F.
Bowen trans. 1945): "The very essence of democratic government consists in the absolute
sovereignty of the majority.
61. Schauer writes:
The more we accept the premise of the argument from democracy, the less
can we impinge on the right of self-government by restricting the power of
the majority. If the argument from democracy would allow to be said things
that the "people" do not want to hear, it is not so much an argument based
on popular will as it is an argument against it.
F. SCHAUER, supra note 60, at 41.
62. The equation is nevertheless quite commonplace. See, e.g., Partlett, supra note 5,
at 458 (footnote omitted) ("I take it that a central tenet of democracy is majority rule. If
the majority decides to suppress free speech, how can it be defended upon democratic
lines?").
63. N. BOBBIO, DEMOCRACY AND DICTATORSHIP 137 (P. Kennealy trans. 1989).
64. H. KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 284-86 (A. Wedberg trans. 1961).
65. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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not the government, possess absolute sovereignty. ' ' 66 For this
reason in America "'the censorial power is in the people over
the Government, and not in the Government over the people.' '"67
If democracy as a form of government is important to us
because it embodies the value of self-determination, we must ask
what it means for a collection of persons to decide governmental
policy in a way that facilitates that value.6 Kelsen answers the
question in a way that begins with Rousseau's formulation in The
Social Contract,69 but that moves rapidly to a distinctively modern
perspective:
A subject is politically free insofar as his individual will is in
harmony with the "collective" (or "general") will expressed in
the social order. Such harmony of the "collective" and the
individual will is guaranteed only if the social order is created
by the individuals whose behavior it regulates. Social order
means determination of the will of the individual. Political
freedom, that is, freedom under social order, is self-determi-
nation of the individual by participating in the creation of the
social order.70
Because it is unconvincing to imagine that the will of individ-
uals can be "in harmony" with the general will in all matters of
political moment, Kelsen ultimately locates the value of self-
determination in the ability of persons to participate in the
process by which the social order is created. He conceives that
process as preeminently one of communication:
The will of the community, in a democracy, is always created
through a running discussion between majority and minority,
through free consideration of arguments for and against a
certain regulation of a subject matter. This discussion takes
place not only in parliament, but also, and foremost, at political
meetings, in newspapers, books, and other vehicles of public
opinion. A democracy without public opinion is a contradiction
in terms:'
66. Id. at 274 (quoting 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 569 (1876)) (citation omitted in original).
67. Id. at 275 (quoting 4 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 934 (1794)).
68. This is the central problematic of Alexander Meiklejohn's work. A. MEIKLEJOHN,
POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE PEOPLE 11 (1948). Meiklejohn
was concerned to analyze "the difference between a political system in which men do
govern themselves and a political system in which men, without their consent, are
governed by others." Id-
69. J. ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT (C. Frankel trans. 1947).
70. H. KELSEN, supra note 64, at 285.
71. Id. at 287-88.
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For Kelsen, then, democracy serves the principle of self-deter-
mination because it subjects the political and social order to
public opinion, which is the product of a dialogic communicative
exchange open to all. The normative essence of democracy is
thus located in the communicative processes necessary to instill
a sense of self-determination, 72 and in the subordination of polit-
ical decisionmaking to those processes.
This logic is widely shared. It leads Benjamin Barber, for
example, to conclude that "there can be no strong democratic
legitimacy without ongoing talk."73 It leads John Dewey to remark
that "[d]emocracy begins in conversation.."74 It leads Durkheim to
observe that "[t]he more that deliberation and reflection and a
critical spirit play a considerable part in the course of public
affairs, the more democratic the nation."75 It leads Claude Lefort
to claim that
modern democracy invites us to replace the notion of a regime
governed by laws, of a legitimate power, by the notion of a
regime founded upon the legitimacy of a debate as to what is
legitimate and what is illegitimate-a debate which is neces-
sarily without any guarantor and without any end.76
In fact the notion that self-determination requires the main-
tenance of a structure of communication open to all commands a
wide consensus. Jiirgen Habermas characterizes that structure
as determined by the effort to attain "a common will, communi-
catively shaped and discursively clarified in the political public
sphere. '77 John Rawls views it as a process of "reconciliation
through public reason."78 Frank Michelman regards it as the
practice of "jurisgenerative politics" through the "dialogic 'mod-
ulation' of participants' pre-political understandings.."79 For all
three thinkers the goal of the structure is to facilitate the
72. For a good discussion of this point, see Freeman, Reason and Agreement in Social
Contract Views, 19 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 122, 154-57 (1990).
73. B. BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY: PARTICIPATORY POLITICS FOR A NEW AGE 136 (1984);
see Pitkin & Shumer, On Participation, DEMOCRACY, Fall 1982, at 43, 43-54.
74. DIALOGUE ON JOHN DEWEY 58 (C. Lamont ed. 1959).
75. E. DURKHEIM, PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND CIVIC MORALS 89 (C. Brookfield trans. 1958).
76. C. LEFORT, DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL THEORY 39 (D. Macey trans. 1988).
77. 2 J. HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION 81 (T. McCarthy trans.
1987).
78. Rawls, Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical, 14 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 223,
230 (1985).
79. Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493, 1526-27 (1988).
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attainment of "agreement" that is "uncoerced, and reached by
citizens in ways consistent with their being viewed as free and
equal persons."80
Coercion is precluded from public debate because the very
purpose of that debate is the practice of self-determination. The
goal is "agreement" (or the attainment of "a common will")
because in such circumstances the individual will is by hypothesis
completely reconciled with the general will. It is important to
understand, however, that this goal is purely aspirational. In fact,
it is precisely because absolute agreement can never actually be
reached that the debate which constitutes democracy is neces-
sarily "without any end," and hence must be independently main-
tained as an ongoing structure of communication.
Without this structure, the simple kind of majoritarian rule
Schauer equates with democracy loses its grounding in the prin-
ciple of self-determination and merely represents the heterono-
mous submission of a minority to the forceful command of a
majority. With such a structure in place, on the other hand, both
majority and minority can each be understood to have had the
opportunity freely to participate within a "system""' of commu-
nication upon which the legitimacy of all political arrangements
depends. Whether that opportunity will actually establish the
value of autonomous self-determination for both majority and
minority is a complex and contingent question, dependent upon
specific historical circumstances. But, in the absence of that
opportunity, realization of the value of autonomous self-determi-
nation will be precluded under conditions characteristic of the
modern state.8
The first amendment principles that this essay considers are
those that function to safeguard from majoritarian interference
this structure of public discourse, so that our democracy will be
able to serve the end of collective self-determination. Four aspects
of that structure require emphasis, for they will be of importance
when we subsequently examine in detail the regulation of racist
speech.
80. Rawls, supra note 78, at 229-30; see I J. HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE
ACTION 25-26 (T. McCarthy trans. 1984); Michelman, upra note 79, at 1526-27.
81. Fiss, supra note 3, at 38.
82. I do not mean to foreclose the possibility that, under special conditions of charis-
matic leadership or identification with traditional authority, the value of self-determination
can be achieved in the absence of a communicative structure of public discourse. I mean
only to imply that such conditions will not ordinarily obtain in the modern rational and
bureaucratic state.
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First, the function of public discourse is to reconcile, to the
extent possible, the will of individuals with the general will.
Public discourse is thus ultimately grounded upon a respect for
individuals seen as "free and equal persons."' ' In the words of
Jean Piaget,
The essence of democracy resides in its attitude towards law
as a product of the collective will, and not as something
emanating from a transcendent will or from the authority
established by divine right. It is therefore the essence of
democracy to replace the unilateral respect of authority by the
mutual respect of autonomous wills.M
The individualism so characteristic of first amendment doctrine8 5
thus flows directly from the central project of democracy. 86
Second, some form of public/private distinction is necessarily
implied by democracy understood as a project of self-determina-
tion. This is because the state undermines the raison d'etre of
its own enterprise to the extent that it itself coercively forms
the "autonomous wills" that democracy seeks to reconcile into
public opinion.87 If the adjective "private" is understood to des-
ignate that which is beyond the coercive formation of the state,
public discourse must be conceptualized as a process through
which "private" perspectives are transformed into public power.
Third, democracy is on this account inherently incomplete. This
is because the "autonomous wills" postulated by democratic the-
83. Rawls, supra note 78, at 230.
84. J. PIAGET, THE MORAL JUDGMENT OF THE CHILD 366 (M. Gabain trans. 1948).
85. See Post, Cultural Heterogeneity and Law: Pornography, Blasphemy, and the First
Amendment, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 297, 314-24 (1988).
86. See, for example, Kateb, Democratic Individuality and the Claims of Politics, 12
POL. THEORY 331, 332 (1984):
To speak, therefore, of individualism is to speak of the most characteristically
democratic political and moral commitment. It would be a sign of defection
from modern democracy to posit some other entity as the necessary or
desirable center of life. There is therefore nothing special (much less, arbi-
trary) in assuming that the doctrine of the individual has the preeminent
place in the theory of democracy.
87. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 205-06 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Such a public/private distinction must, of course, be understood as inherently unstable
and problematic, for all government regulation influences, to one degree or another, the
formation of individual identity. See, e.g., Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private Prefer-
ences, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1129, 1138-39 (1986). For this reason, the distinction should be
regarded as a pragmatic instrument for distinguishing those aspects of the self considered
indispensable for the exercise of political and moral autonomy, and hence as beyond the
coercive formation of the state.
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ory do not and cannot appear ex nihilo. The only reason that a
person possesses a personality capable of autonomous choice is
because the person has internalized "the institutions of [the]
community into his own conduct."' This process of socialization,
which is prerequisite for personal identity, is not itself a matter
of independent election, but rather is attributable to accidents of
birth and acculturation. Democracy thus necessarily presupposes
important (not to say foundational) aspects of the social world
organized along nondemocratic lines. For this reason public dis-
course must always exist in tension with other forms of com-
munication ("nonpublic speech").
Fourth, democracy, like all forms of government, must ulti-
mately be capable of accomplishing the tasks of governance. As
Alexander Meiklejohn notes, "Self-government is nonsense unless
the 'self' which governs is able and determined to make its will
effective."8 9 Democratic governments must therefore have the
power to regulate behavior. But because public discourse is
understood as the communicative medium through which the
democratic "self" is itself constituted, public discourse must in
important respects remain exempt from democratic regulation.
We use the speech/action distinction to mark the boundaries of
this exemption. Because all "[w]ords are deeds,"0 this distinction
is purely pragmatic. We designate the communicative processes
necessary to sustain the principle of collective self-determination
"speech" and thus insulate it from majoritarian interference.
B. Community, Civility Rules, and Public Discourse
Restraints on racist speech characteristically involve certain
general first amendment issues that I briefly review in this
Section in light of the functional concerns of public discourse. In
so doing I confine myself to summarizing conclusions, the detailed
arguments for which I have developed elsewhere.9
If democratic self-governance presupposes a social world in
which "autonomous wills" are to be coordinated and reconciled,
88. G. MEAD, MIND, SELF & SocIETy 162 (C. Morris ed. 1934).
89. A. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 68, at 14.
90. L. WITTGENSTEIN, CULTURE AND VALUE 46e (P. Winch trans. 1980).
91. See generally Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous
Opinion, Democratic Deliberation, and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HARv. L. REV.
601 (1990) [hereinafter Post, The Constitutional Concept]; Post, The Social Foundations of
Defamation Law: Reputation and the Constitution, 74 CALF. L. REV. 691 (1986) [hereinafter
Post, Defamation Law]; Post, The Socl Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self in
the Common Law Tort, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 957 (1989) [hereinafter Post, Privacy].
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there is an important form of social organization, which I call
"community," that rests on exactly the opposite presupposition.
Building on the work of Michael Sandel, 92 1 define a "community"
as a social formation that inculcates norms into the very identities
of its members. So far from being considered autonomous, persons
within a community are understood to depend, for the very
integrity and dignity of their personalities, upon the observance
of these norms.
For hundreds of years an important function of the common
law has been to safeguard the most important of these norms,
which I call "civility rules." These rules apply to communication
as well as to action, and their enforcement lies at the foundation
of such communicative torts as defamation,93 invasion of privacy, 94
and intentional infliction of emotional distress.9 5 Through these
torts the common law not only protects the integrity of the
personality of individual community members, but it also serves
authoritatively to articulate a community's norms and hence to
define a community's identity.
There is an obvious tension between community and democ-
racy. Public discourse within a democracy is legally conceived as
the communicative medium through which individuals choose the
forms of their communal life; public discourse within a community
is legally conceived as a medium through which the values of a
particular life are displayed and enacted.96 Democracy seeks to
open the space of public discourse for collective self-constitution;
community seeks to bound that space through the enforcement
of civility rules. In the inevitable negotiation between democracy
and community, the first amendment has, since the 1940's, gen-
erally served the purposes of democracy by suspending the
enforcement of civility rules in such landmark cases as Cantwell
v. Connecticut,97 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,98 Cohen v. Cal-
ifornia,99 and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell.100
92. See M. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE (1982).
93. See Post, Defamation Law, supra note 91, at 699-719.
94. See Post, Privacy, supra note 91, at 959-87.
95. See Post, The Constitutional Concept, supra note 91, at 616-46.
96. See, e.g., id. at 627-33.
97. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
98. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
99. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
100. 485 U.S. 46 (1988). The American first amendment is unique in thus separating
democracy from community. I suspect that the origins of this separation lie both in our
tradition of individualism and in the fact of our cultural diversity. For instructive
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There is, however, a complex and reciprocal relationship be-
tween democracy and community. Democracy necessarily presup-
poses some form of social institution, like community, through
which the concrete identities of "autonomous" democratic citizens
can be defined and instantiated. The paradigmatic examples of
such institutions are the family and the elementary school. In
these settings a child's identity is created in the first instance
through decidedly undemocratic means; it "comes to be by way
of the internalization of sanctions that are de facto threatened
and carried out."'' 1
This fact has important consequences for the practice of public
discourse. The specific purpose of that discourse is the achieve-
ment of some form of "reconciliation through public reason,"'10 2
yet because the identity of democratic citizens will have been
formed by reference to community norms, speech in violation of
civility rules will characteristically be perceived as both irrational
and coercive. 03 This creates what I have elsewhere termed the
"paradox of public discourse": the first amendment, in the name
of democracy, suspends legal enforcement of the very civility
rules that make rational deliberation possible.0 4 The upshot of
the paradox is that the separation of public discourse from
community depends in some measure upon the spontaneous per-
sistence of civility. In the absence of such persistence, the use
of legal regulation to enforce community standards of civility
may be required as an unfortunate but necessary option of last
resort. A paradigmatic example of this use may be found in the
"fighting words" doctrine of Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire.0 5
If community norms thus infiltrate and make possible the
practice of democracy, so the ethical imperatives of democracy
can be expected to reshape the terms of community life. A stable
and successful democratic state will regulate the lives of its
citizens in ways consistent with the underlying principle of "their
being viewed as free and equal persons."'1 6 Such regulation will
influence community institutions, moving them closer toward the
contrasts, see Jacobsohn, Alternative Pluralisms: Israeli and American Constitutionalism
in Comparative Perspective, REv. POL., Spring 1989, at 159; Kommers, The Jurisprudence
of Free Speech in the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany, 53 S. CAL. L.
REv. 657 (1980).
101. 2 J. HABERMAS, supra note 77, at 38.
102. Rawls, supra note 78, at 230.
103. Post, The Constitutional Concept, supra note 91, at 641-44.
104. Id.
105. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
106. Rawls, supra note 78, at 230.
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realization of specifically democratic principles. The only intrinsic
limitation on the ability of the democratic state to regulate
community institutions in this manner is the public/private dis-
tinction, which requires that at some point the coercive formation
of the identity of individuals remain beyond the purview of the
state.
C. The Domain of Public Discourse
This essay primarily concerns the regulation of racist expres-
sion within public discourse. "Public discourse" may be defined
as encompassing the communicative processes necessary for the
formation of public opinion, whether or not that opinion is di-
rected toward specific government personnel, decisions, or poli-
cies. Democratic self-governance requires that public opinion be
broadly conceived as a process of "collective self-definition"'10 7
that will necessarily precede and inform any specific government
action or inaction. Public discourse cannot encompass all com-
munication within a democracy, however, because both the public/
private distinction and the paradox of public discourse imply that
the processes of democratic self-governance depend upon the
persistence of other nondemocratic forms of social organization,
such as community.
Because the first amendment extends extraordinary protection
to public discourse, it is important to demarcate the boundary
between such discourse and other speech. I have discussed this
issue in detail elsewhere 08 and will not repeat that analysis here.
Suffice it to say that the boundary is inherently uncertain and
subject to perennial reevaluation. Factors that the Supreme Court
has used to delineate the boundary include the content of speech
and the manner of its dissemination. 0 9 Speech that can be said
to be about matters of "public concern" is ordinarily classified
as public discourse," 0 as is speech that is widely distributed to
the public at large through the mass media. There are exceptions,
however, like commercial speech, which flow from the influence
of traditional conventions that define for us a recognizable "genre"
of public speech."'
107. Pitkin, Justice: On Relating Private and Public, 9 POL. THEORY 327, 346 (1981).
108. See Post, The Constitutional Concept, supra note 91, at 667-84.
109. Id. at 667.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 680.
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It is difficult to discuss profitably the abstract question of
setting the boundaries of public discourse. At the most general
level, these boundaries mark the point at which our commitment
to the dialogue of autonomous self-governing citizens shifts to
other values, as for example to that of the socially implicated
self characteristic of community. The particular points at which
our commitments alter is a highly specific and contextual inquiry
requiring case-by-case assessment.
I confine myself, therefore, to two preliminary observations.
First, the constitutional protections extended to public discourse
differ importantly from those extended to nonpublic speech. Thus
even if the first amendment were to immunize from legal regu-
lation the circulation of certain racist ideas in newspapers, it
would not follow that the expression of those same ideas could
not be restrained by the government within the workplace, where
an image of dialogue among autonomous self-governing citizens
would be patently out of place. 112 The first amendment values at
stake in the regulation of nonpublic speech are complex and
diverse," 3 and I will not be able to review them within the
limited span of this essay.
Second, the category of racist expression cannot be excluded
as such from the domain of public discourse. The racist content
of a particular communication is only one of many factors relevant
to the determination of whether the communication lies within
or without of that domain. Thus the leaflet at issue in Beauhar-
nais v. Illinois,"4 which was an effort "to petition the mayor and
council of Chicago to pass laws for segregation,"1 5 was plainly
112. See, e.g., Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 237-38 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406
U.S. 957 (1972); EEOC v. Murphy Motor Freight Lines, 488 F. Supp. 381, 385 (D. Minn.
1980); cf. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65-66 (1986) (holding that speech that
constitutes sexual harassment may be regulated). I do not mean to imply, however, that
all speech within the workplace is excluded from public discourse. See, e.g., Connick v.
Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 149 (1983); Givhan v. Western Line Consol. School Dist., 439 U.S.
410, 415-16 (1979).
113. It should be emphasized that in text I am using the adjective "public" in a discrete
and stipulative sense to refer to that speech necessary for democratic self-governance.
Thus I do not mean to imply that speech within the workplace is "nonpublic" in the
sense that it is unimportant, or that it is "private" in the sense of being intrinsically
insulated from governmental control or regulation. See Karst, Private Discrimination and
Public Responsibility: Patterson in Context, 1989 SuP. CT. REV. 1, 10-11; supra text
accompanying notes 106-11. My point is instead that if the regulation of nonpublic speech
is in fact protected by the first amendment, it will be on the basis of constitutional values
other than democratic self-governance.
114. 343 U.S. 250 (1952). The leaflet is reproduced in Justice Black's dissenting opinion.
Id. at 276 (Black, J., dissenting).
115. Id. at 267 (Black, J., dissenting).
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an effort to engage in public discourse, despite its overt and
virulent racism. Similarly, the infamous Nazi march in Skokie
was also an attempt to participate in public discourse, notwith-
standing its repulsive political symbolism. 116 In both cases racists
used well-recognized media for the communication of ideas in
order to address and affect public opinion.17
III. RACIST SPEECH AND PUBLIC DISCOURSE
We are now in a position to assess the justifications for the
regulation of racist expression in light of the first amendment
values associated with public discourse. In some cases this as-
sessment allows us to reach definite conclusions; in others it
simply helps to clarify the issues raised by particular forms of
regulation. In each case I use the term "racist speech" to encom-
pass the class of communications that would have to be regulated
in order to ameliorate the specific harm under consideration.
A. Public Discourse and the Intrinsic Harm of Racist Ideas
It is of course a commonplace of first amendment jurisprudence
"that the government must remain neutral in the marketplace of
ideas.""8 The justification for this principle as applied to public
discourse is straightforward. Democracy serves the Value of self-
determination by establishing a communicative structure within
which the varying persiectives of individuals can be reconciled
through reason. If the state were to forbid the expression of a
particular idea, the government would become, with respect to
individuals holding that idea, heteronomous and nondemocratic.
This is incompatible with a form of government predicated upon
treating its citizens "in ways consistent with their being viewed
as free and equal persons.""19
For this reason the value of self-determination requires that
public discourse be open to the opinions of all. "[S]ilence coerced
by law-the argument of force in its worst form"'120 is constitu-
116. See Collin v. Smith, 447 F. Supp. 676 (N.D. Ill.), affid, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978).
117. To exclude from public discourse the category of racist speech as such would be
equivalent to establishing a per se exclusion of racist ideas from public discourse, a form
of regulation whose constitutionality is assessed in Section III(A), infra.
118. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988) (quoting FCC v. Pacifica Found.,
438 U.S. 726, 745-46 (1978)).
119. Rawls, supra note 78, at 230.
120. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-76 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
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tionally forbidden. In a democracy, as Piaget notes, "there are
no more crimes of opinion, but only breaches of procedure. All
opinions are tolerated so long as their protagonists urge their
acceptance by legal methods."'121 The notion that racist ideas
ought to be forbidden within public discourse because of their
"elemental wrongness"'1 is thus fundamentally irreconcilable with
the rationale for first amendment freedoms.
The contemporary debate nevertheless contains three distinct
arguments that racist ideas ought to be proscribed because of
their "deontic" harm. The first is that the idea of racism is "sui
generis" because it is "universally condemned."1 The same au-
thors who make this claim, however, also stress "the structural
reality of racism in America," a reality manifested not merely in
an "epidemic of racist incidents," but also in the widespread
racist beliefs characteristic of "upper-class whites" and important
social "institutions."'24 In fact it is probably fair to characterize
these authors as proponents of regulating racist speech precisely
because of their urgent sense of the prevalewe of racist practices.
Although the nightmare of these practices ought to occasion
strong public response, their prevalence substantially undermines
the conclusion that racism is "universally condemned" 125 in any
sense relevant for first amendment analysis. Such practices can
be understood only as manifestations of strongly held but oth-
erwise unarticulated racist ideas.
12 6
A second argument is that the failure to regulate racist ideas
amounts to a symbolic endorsement of racist speech, which is
intolerable in "a society committed to ideals of social and political
equality."'1 In essence this argument rejects the public/private
121. J. PIAGET, supra note 84, at 57; see id. at 63.
122. Wright, supra note 5, at 10.
123. Matsuda, supra note 5, at 2359; see Kretzmer, supra note 5, at 458.
124. Matsuda, supra note 5, at 2332-34. "Racist hate messages are rapidly increasing
and are widely distributed in this country using a variety of low and high technologies."
Id. at 2336. Kretzmer is also concerned with the potential spread of racist ideas. See
Kretzmer, supra note 5, at 464-65.
125. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
126. I thus do not reach the theoretically more fundamental question of why it should
make a constitutional difference that racist ideas are "universally condemned." See, for
example, the Court's rejection in United States v. Eichman, 110 S. Ct. 2404, 2409 (1990),
of the Solicitor General's invitation to overrule Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533 (1989),
on the grounds of "Congress' recent recognition of a purported 'national consensus'
favoring a prohibition on flag-burning. . . . Even assuming such a consensus exists, any
suggestion that the Government's interest in suppressing speech becomes more weighty
as popular opposition to that speech grows is foreign to the First Amendment." Eichman,
110 S. Ct. at 2409.
127. Kretzmer, supra note 5, at 456; see Matsuda, supra note 5, at 2338:
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distinction required by democratic self-governance. 128 But if re-
sponsibility for ideas advanced by individuals in public discourse
were to be attributed to government, the government could not
then also be deemed responsive to those ideas in the way required
by the principle of self-determination. Just as a library could not
function if it were understood as endorsing the views of the
authors whose books it collects and displays, so also in a democ-
racy the government could not serve the value of autonomy if it
were understood as endorsing the ideas expressed by private
persons in public discourse. 129
A third argument is that the free expression of racist ideas is
inconsistent with our commitment to the egalitarian ideals of the
fourteenth amendment. At root this argument rejects autonomy
as the principal value of democracy and substitutes instead what
Kenneth Karst has eloquently argued is "the substantive center
of the fourteenth amendment: the principle of equal citizen-
ship." 130 Although some political theorists have endorsed this
position,' 31 it runs against the overwhelming American commit-
ment to the importance of "self-rule," to the fundamental belief
"that the American people are politically free insomuch as they
are governed by themselves collectively."'3 2
Of course the principle of self-rule contains its own commitment
to the value of equal citizenship, to the notion that, as a formal
matter, citizens must be "viewed as free and equal persons."'133
But the meaning of this commitment is measured by the purpose
of enabling the processes of self-determination. The appeal to the
fourteenth amendment, on the other hand, is meant to signify
However irrational racist speech may be, it hits right at the emotional place
where we feel the most pain. The aloneness comes not only from the hate
message itself, but also from the government response of tolerance. When
hundreds of police officers are called out to protect racist marchers, when
the courts refuse redress for racial insult, . . . the victim becomes a stateless
person. Target-group members can either identify with a community that
promotes racist speech, or they can admit that the community does not
include them.
128. Matsuda, supra note 5, at 2378.
129. See Greenawalt, supra note 5, at 304-05.
130. Karst, Citizenship, Race, and Marginality, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 1 (1988).
131. See, e.g., N. BOBBIO, supra note 63, at 157-58; C. GOULD, RETHINKING DEMOCRACY:
FREEDOM AND COOPERATION IN POLITICS, ECONOMY, AND SOCIETY 90 (1988); J. PENNOCK,
DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL THEORY 3-161 (1979).
132. Michelman, supra note 79, at 1500-01. Michelman notes that "no earnest, non-
disruptive participant in American constitutional debate is quite free to reject" this
"belief." Id. at 1500.
133. Rawls, supra note 78, at 230.
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commitment to a substantive value of equality that is not defined
by reference to this purpose, so that the implementation of the
value may adversely affect processes of self-determination.'3 The
argument thus envisions the possibility of "balancing" fourteenth
amendment values against first amendment principles.
In balancing the value of equal citizenship against the principle
of self-determination, however, we must ask who is empowered
to interpret the meaning of the highly contestable value of equal
citizenship. To the extent that the value of equal citizenship is
used to justify limiting public discourse, the interpreter of the
value cannot be the people, because the very function of the
appeal to the fourteenth amendment is to truncate the commu-
nicative processes by which the people clarify their collective
will. 3 5 In such circumstances the Ultimate Interpreter, whoever
or whatever it may finally turn out to be, must impose its will
without popular accountability. Our government currently con-
tains no such Interpreter, not even the Supreme Court, whose
constitutional decisions are always shadowed by the potential of
constitutional amendment or political reconstruction through sub-
sequent appointments. The impossibility of locating such an In-
terpreter suggests the difficulties that attend the argument from
the fourteenth amendment.36
B. Public Discourse and Harm to Identifiable Groups
The purpose of public discourse is to reconcile through reason
the differences occasioned by a collection of "autonomous wills."
Groups neither reason nor have an autonomous will; only persons
do. This is the source of the profound individualism that char-
acterizes first amendment doctrine. The question is whether that
134. See, for example, Language as Violence, supra note 5, at 360 (remarks of Mari
Matsuda):
I use the principle of equality as a starting point .... [If I were to give
primacy to any one right, and if I were to create a hierarchy, I would put
equality first, because the right of speech is meaningless to people who do
not have equality. I mean substantive as well as procedural equality.
135. That members of minority groups are now embraced within the circle of the
people and afforded the formal equality required by first amendment processes of self-
determination is not, of course, due to any principle of the first amendment, but rather
to the principle of equal citizenship embodied in the fourteenth amendment. In this
fundamental sense, therefore, no hierarchical relationship between the first and fourteenth
amendments can exist.
136. For fuller consideration of a sophisticated argument for "balancing" the values of
the fourteenth amendment against those of the first, see infra text accompanying notes
21049.
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individualism is compatible with the regulation of public discourse
in order to prevent harm to groups.
It is rather common for the laws of other countries to restrain
speech deemed harmful to groups, speech that, in the words of
the Illinois statute at issue in Beauharnais, casts "contempt,
derision, or obloquy" on a particular group.3 7 Such laws subor-
dinate individual expression to the protection of group status
and dignity, typically on the theory that group membership is
an essential ingredient of personal identity. Hence, as Gary
Jacobsohn notes in his description of Israeli law, groups are seen
"as units whose corporate identity carries with it . . . claim[s]
upon the state for specific entitlement."'' 1 Thus the law will in
certain situations give "greater priority to fraternal and com-
munal attachments over the subjective choices of individuals." 139
In American law, by contrast, there is a tendency to view
groups as mere "collections of individuals,' ' 140 whose claims are
no greater than those of their constituent members.' 4 ' This ten-
dency is virtually fixed by the individualist presuppositions of
public discourse. Thus in Cantwell v. Connecticut42 the Court
extended first amendment protection to an anti-Catholic diatribe
so violent that it "would offend not only persons of that persua-
sion, but all others who respect the honestly held religious faith
of their fellows."'4 3 The Court reasoned that this constitutional
immunity was necessary so that "many types of life, character,
opinion and belief can develop unmolested and unobstructed."' 44
This reasoning presupposes that groups evolve through the in-
formed choices of individuals. 145 The Ciurt subordinated the sen-
137. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 251 (1952) (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38,
471 (1949)). Antiblasphemy regulations are a common example of such laws. See Post,
supra note 85, at 305-17; THE LAW COMMISSION, OFFENCES AGAINST RELIGION AND PUBLIC
WORSHIP 39-53 (Working Paper No. 79, 1981). Many countries also have laws prohibiting
group defamation. See, e.g., E. BARENDT, FREEDOM OF SPEECH 161-67 (1985); Lasson, Group
Libel, supra note 5, at 88-89; Matsuda, supra note 5, at 2341-48.
138. Jacobsohn, supra note 100, at 175.
139. Id. at 170.
140. Id. at 175.
141. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
142. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
143. Id. at 309.
144. Id. at 310.
145. For an excellent study of the efforts of contemporary Americans to forge new
communities, like the Castro district in San Francisco, and hence to "reinvent themselves"
by constructing "new lives, new families, even new societies," see F. FITZGERALD, CITIES
ON A HILL: A JOURNAL THROUGH CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN CULTURES 23 (1986). FitzGerald
views such efforts as "quintessentially American"; try to imagine, she suggests, "Parisians
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sibilities of members of established groups, such as Catholics, to
the communicative structure necessary for these choices. 146 It
thus refused to allow unattractive and highly offensive represen-
tations of the Church to be excluded from public discourse.
Cantwell makes special sense because American religious groups
have since the nineteenth century been organized on the principle
of "voluntarism,"'147 on the notion that "religion is . . . a matter
of individual choice."'48 It might be argued, however, that race
is quite another matter, one in which a certain kind of group
identity is inescapably imposed upon a person by accident of
birth. For this reason group identity might be seen as primary
with respect to race, and the individualist foundations of public
discourse-the assumption that racial groups are determined by
processes of individual decisionmaking-repudiated as unrealistic.
This argument is powerful and requires close attention. In
analyzing it, we can draw on the distinction that has emerged in
feminist writings between "sex," which refers to biological facts,
and "gender," which refers to socially constructed roles. 49 . To
confuse the two, to predicate the social content of gender upon
the biological fact of sex, is to fall into "the determinist or
essentialist trap."50 The political point of the distinction is to
keep perpetually open for discussion and analysis the social
meaning of being born female and included within the group
"women.' 51 Even if one is not free to opt out of the group, the
possibility ought nevertheless to be preserved that the identity
of the group be ultimately determined, in the language of Nancy
Fraser, "through dialogue and collective struggle.' 52 Fraser writes
that "[iun a society as complex as ours, it does not seem to me
wise or even possible to extrapolate" the outcome of that dialogue
creating a gay colony or a town for grandparents" Id. If in Europe or Canada group
identity precedes the attempt to ask "the essential questions of who we . . . are, and
how we ought to live," id. at 20, 389-90, FitzGerald's- work illustrates the extent to which
group identity in America tends to follow on that attempt, and hence ultimately to rest
on individualist premises.
146. For a more detailed discussion, see Post, supra note 85, at 319-35.
147. See P. MILLER, THE LIFE OF THE MIND IN AMERICA 40-43 (1965).
148. R. BELLAH, R. MADSEN, W. SULLIVAN, A. SWIDLER, & S. TIPTON, HABITS OF THE
HEART: INDIVIDUALISM AND COMMITMENT IN AMERICAN LIFE 225 (1985).
149. See, e.g., D. RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER 5 (1989); Marcus, Reflections on the
Significance of the Sex/Gender System: Divorce Law Reform in New York, 42 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 55, 55-63 (1987).
150. Marcus, supra note 149, at 61; see Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal
Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581 (1990).
151. See Harris, supra note 150, at 615-16.
152. Fraser, Toward a Discourse Ethic of Solidarity, 5 PRAXIS INT'L 425, 429 (1986).
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"from the current, prepoliticized experiences and idiolects of
women, especially since it is likely, in my view, that these will
turn out to be the current prepoliticized experiences and idiolects
only of some women."'1
Fraser's point is that regardless of the biological basis of sex,
the social meaning of gender is a political issue whose outcome,
like that of all political issues, must be regarded as indeterminate.
She thus applies the structure of democratic self-determination
to the constitution of group identity. The individualist assump-
tions of that structure create a form of communication in which
political indeterminacy is preserved; they guarantee that the
dialogue envisioned by Fraser will remain open to the perspec-
tives of all women. If the identity of the group "women" were
understood to have a content determinate enough to employ the
force of law to silence dissenting views, the law would hegemon-
ically impose the perspective of only some women.
The same logic, I believe, holds true for racial groups. We
must distinguish race as a biological category from race as a
social category. Even if unfortunately "the attempt to establish
a biological basis of race has not been swept into the dustbin of
history,"' 54 it would nevertheless be deplorable to construct first
amendment principles on the basis of a biological view of race.
What is most saliently at issue is rather "race as a social concept":
"The effort must be made to understand race as an unstable and
'decentered' complex of social meanings constantly being trans-
formed by political struggle."'55 To the extent that the social
meaning of race is thus profoundly controversial156 - and it is
controversial not merely for members of minority groups but
also for the entire Nation 57 - the individualist premises of public
153. Id.
154. M. OMI & H. WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES: FROM THE 1960s
TO THE 1980s 59 (1986). For an example of the persistence of a biological model of race,
see Herrnstein, Still an American Dilemma, PUB. INTEREST, Winter 1990, at 3.
155. M. Omi & H. WINANT, supra note 154, at 60, 68. Omi and Winant write of the
"continuous temptation to think of race as an essence, as something fixed, concrete and
objective." Id. at 68; see Appiah, The Uncompleted Argument: Du Bois and the Illusion of
Race, in H. GATES, "RACE," WRITING AND DIFFERENCE 36 (1986): "Talk of 'race' is partic-
ularly distressing for those of us who take culture seriously. . . .What exists 'out there'
in the world-communities of meaning, shading variously into each other in the rich
structure of the social world-is the province not of biology but of hermeneutic under-
standing."
156. For a good example, see Scales-Trent, Black Women and the Constitution: Finding
Our Place, Asserting Our Rights, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 9 (1989).
157. For a brief history of the interdependence of understandings of national identity
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discourse will ensure that it remains open to democratic consti-
tution.
This lack of closure may of course be threatening, for it casts
the creation of group identity upon the uncertain currents of
public discourse. The safe harbor of legal regulation may, by
contrast, appear to promise members of minority groups more
secure control over the meaning of their social experience. But
that promise is illusory, for it is profoundly inconsistent with the
analysis of racism prevalent in the contemporary literature. To
the extent that racism is viewed as pervasive among whites, and
to the extent that whites, as a dominant group, can be expected
to hold the levers of legal power, there would seem little reason
to trust the law to establish socially acceptable meanings for
race. Such meanings cannot be determined by reference to easy
or bright-line distinctions, as for example those between positive
or negative ascriptions of group identity. The work of figures as
diverse as William Julius Wilson,es Shelby Steele,159 and Louis
Farrakhan160 illustrates how highly critical characterizations of
racial groups can nevertheless serve constructive social purposes.
To vest in an essentially white legal establishment the power to
discriminate authoritatively among such characterizations and
purposes would seem certain to be disempowering. 161
and understandings of race, see Gleason, American Identity and Americanization, in W.
PETERSEN, M. NOVAK, & P. GLEASON, CONCEPTS OF ETHNICITY 57 (1982). A small but I
suspect paradigmatic example of this interdependence may be found in the following
passage from a student letter to The Daily Californian:
Advertising, television, schools and government are areas of society where
racism is largely promoted. Its existence is not easily eradicated. Phrases
like "blackmail," "black ball" and "black mood" are common ways "blackness"
is communicated in negative terms .... One of my professors frequently
employs terms like "black lie" to mean the worst of all lies. It takes a
conscious effort to disregard these statements and prevent such negative
influence on one's psyche. But we must understand that daily use of this
terminology reinforces the attack on African-American identity and value.
Broughton, Promote Afro-American Culture, The Daffy Californian, Sept. 12, 1989, at 4.
The writer's point is relevant to the perspectives of members of both minority and
majority groups; in fact the point effectively demonstrates the essential reciprocity of
these perspectives.
158. Wilson, Social Research and the Underclass Debate, BuLL. AM. ACAD. ARTS & SCI.,
Nov. 1989, at 30.
159. S. STEELE, THE CONTENT OF OUR CHARACTER: A NEW VISION OF RACE IN AMERICA
(1990).
160. See Black Power, Foul and Fragrant, ECONOMIST, Oct. 12, 1985, at 25, for a
summary of Farrakhan's critical assessment of the condition of many African-Americans.
161. Note, in this regard, Nadine Strossen's evidence that regulations of racist speech
have historically proved to be "particularly threatening to the speech of racial and
political minorities." Strossen, supra note 5, at 556-59.
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The conclusion that group harm ought not to justify legal
regulation is reflected in technical first amendment doctrine in
the fact that virtually all communications likely to provoke a
claim of group harm will be privileged as assertions of evaluative
opinion. 162 The following language, for example, gave rise to legal
liability in Beauharnais: "If persuasion and the need to prevent
the white race from becoming mongrelized by the negro will not
unite us, then the aggressions . . rapes, robberies, knives, guns
and marijuana of the negro, SURELY WILL."'163 Justice Frank-
furter interpreted this language as a false factual assertion: "No
one will gainsay that it is libelous falsely to charge another with
being a rapist, robber, carrier of knives and guns, and user of
marijuana."' 164 This interpretation, however, seems plainly incor-
rect. To accuse an individual of using marijuana is to assert that
she has committed certain specific acts, but to accuse the group
"blacks" of using marijuana is not to make an analogous assertion.
Some blacks will have used marijuana, and most will not have.
The question is thus not the existence of certain specific acts,
but rather whether those acts can appropriately be used to
characterize the group. The fundamental issue is the nature of
the group's identity, an issue that almost certainly ought to be
characterized as one of evaluative opinion.
Because the social meaning of race is inherently controversial,
most statements likely to give rise to actions for group harm
will be negative assessments of the identity of racial groups, and
hence statements of evaluative opinion. No serious commentator
would advocate a trial to determine the truth or falsity of such
statements; the point is rather that such statements should not
be made at all because of the deep injury they cause. But in a
context in which group identity is a matter for determination
through political struggle and disagreement, the hypostatized
injury of a group cannot, consistent with the processes that
instantiate the principle of self-determination, be grounds to
legally silence characterizations of group identity within public
discourse.
162. Or, in the language that the Court recently proposed in Milkovich v. Lorain
Journal Co., 110 S. Ct. 2695 (1990), claims of group harm will most likely be privileged
as nonfactual assertions of "ideas." For a discussion of the first amendment distinction
between fact and ideas, see Post, The Constitutional Concept, supra note 91, at 649-61.
For a discussion of the close relationship between group defamation and nonfactual ideas,
see D. RICHARDS, TOLERATION AND THE CONSTITUTION 190-93 (1986); Greenawalt, supra
note 5, at 305-06.
163. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 276 (1952) (ellipsis in original).
164. Id. at 257-58.
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Commentators who stress the theme of group harm vigorously
emphasize the fact that racist speech does not injure random
groups; it damages precisely those groups who have historically
suffered egregious oppression and subordination.165 But although
the tragedy of this fact is obvious, its constitutional implications
are not. Our history certainly warrants the assumption that racist
speech will inflict terrible injuries on victim groups. But the
question is whether these injuries are so unspeakable as to justify
suspending the democratic constitution of group identities. One
approach might be to avoid this tension by characterizing the
injuries of racist speech in such a way that their legal redress
would actually be required by the principles of public discourse.
Thus it can be argued that the stigmatizing and disabling effects
of racist speech effectively exclude its victims from participation
in public discourse. This approach suggests an important line of
analysis, but I wish to defer consideration of it until Section
III(D), infra, when it can be placed in the context of other
justifications for restraints on racist speech that turn on harms
to the marketplace of ideas.
Another method of avoiding the tension between group harm
and democratic principles would be to claim that racist speech
ought to be characterized as a "mechanism of subordination"
within a larger system of suppression, rather than as a form of
communication. 166 This claim requires us to determine the criteria
by which speech can be designated as action and hence excluded
from public discourse. The standard implicitly advanced by the
claim is that if communication is intimately connected to larger
social relationships that are deeply undesirable, the communica-
tion can for that reason be characterized as action.
The difficulty with this standard is that all communication
grows out of and embodies social relationships; for this reason
all communication is both speech and action. The function of
public discourse is to create a protected space within which
communication, even if embodying social relationships, can be
protected as speech if formulated and disseminated in ways
relevant for democratic self-governance. Such a space opens up
the possibility of subjecting social relationships to rational re-
flection, dialogue, and (hence) self-control. It thus enables "self-
rule" to be reconciled with rule "by laws.' ' 67 If communication
165. See, e.g., Matsuda, supra note 5, at 2358.
166. Id.
167. Michelman, supra note 79, at 1501.
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could be excluded from this space because it embodies social
relations of which we disapprove, public discourse could no longer
perform this function. There is no difference between excluding
speech from public discourse because we condemn the social
relationships it embodies and excluding speech from public dis-
course because we condemn the ideas by which those social
relationships are embodied. In the end, therefore, the argument
that racist speech is a form of action reduces to the claim, which
we have already considered, that racist speech ought to be
restrained because of its inconsistency with the egalitarian ideals
of the fourteenth amendment.
C. Public Discourse and Harm to Individuals
There appear at first blush to be important differences between
claims of group harm and claims of individual harm. To the
extent group identity is understood to be a matter of political
struggle (and hence dialogic interaction), speech containing neg-
ative ascriptions of that identity cannot be censored without
undermining the democratic nature of that struggle. But individ-
ual identity does not seem to rest on political struggle and
dialogue in this way. Indeed, one's spontaneous image is of fully
formed individuals entering the realm of public discourse to reach
agreement on issues that concern their collective, rather than
personal, lives. Speech damaging personal life can thus be re-
stricted without undercutting the very purposes of public dis-
course.
This perspective, however, rests on a rather sharp distinction
between individual and collective identity, a distinction that sim-
ply cannot be maintained. The very reason that racist speech
harms individual persons is because it so violently ruptures the
forms of social respect that are necessary for the maintenance
of individual personality. These forms of respect, when taken
together, constitute a collective, community identity. Hence the
state can prevent the individual harm caused by racist speech
only by enforcing pertinent standards of community identity. The
interdependence of individual and collective identity is thus pre-
supposed in the very concept of individual harm.
This interdependence lies behind well-established constitutional
prohibitions on restricting public discourse because it is
"offensive"'6 or "outrageous,"'169 or because it affronts "dignity"
168. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 16 (1971).
169. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 52 (1988).
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or is "insulting" or causes "public odium" or "public disrepute.' ' 0
Such speech causes intense individual suffering because it violates
community norms, yet the Court has required its toleration in
order to prevent the state from using the authority of law to
enforce particular conceptions of collective life.'7 '
Questions of personal identity are in fact always at stake in
discussions of collective self-definition. For this reason effective
political dialogue requires that participants be constantly willing
to be transformed. As Frank Michelman points out, public dis-
course is impossible so long as "the participants' pre-political
self-understandings and social perspectives must axiomatically be
regarded as completely impervious to the persuasion of the
process itself."'1 2 As our collective aspirations change, so will our
respective personal identities. Thus restrictions on public dis-
course designed to protect those identities from harm will nec-
essarily also restrict self-determination as to our collective life.
If group harm is an inevitable price of the political constitution
of group identity, individual injury is an unavoidable cost of the
political constitution of community identity.
It is important to emphasize the narrowness of this conclusion.
In recent years an important theme of our national life has been
the opposition to racism. We have enacted that opposition by
legally regulating racist behavior like discrimination. Because
action both creates and manifests identity, this regulation inhibits
the formation and expression of racist identities. So also does
regulation prohibiting certain kinds of racist speech in nonpublic
speech, as for example in the workplace.73 In effect we have
determined to use government force to reshape community in-
stitutions in order to combat racism. This is an appropriate and
laudable use of democratic power. 74 But it is legitimate precisely
170. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 316, 322 (1988). "[I]n public debate our own citizens
must tolerate insulting, and even outrageous, speech in order to provide 'adequate
breathing space to the freedoms protected by the First Amendment.'" Id. at 322 (quoting
Hustler Magazine, 485 U.S. at 56); see Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533, 2543-47 (1989).
171. I elaborate on this argument in Post, The Constitutional Concept, supra note 91,
at 626-46. The cases cited in notes 168-70 supra thus stand foursquare against the
application to public discourse of the tort of racial insult as proposed by Delgado, supra
note 4, Love, supra note 5, and Wright, supra note 5.
172. Michelman, supra note 79, at 1526; see F. CUNNINGHAm, DEMOCRATIC THEORY AND
SOCIALISM 188-91 (1987).
173. See supra notes 112-13 and accompanying text.
174. It should be noted, however, that the public/private distinction necessary for
democratic governance will require that at some point limitations be placed on the ability
of the state coercively to form citizens with nonracist identities. See supra note 87.
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because we have adopted it in a manner consistent with the
principle of self-determination; it reflects a national identity that
we have freely chosen.
This legitimacy is possible because of public discourse, which
serves the value of self-determination because it is so structured
that every call for national identity has the opportunity to make
its case. There is a significant difference, therefore, between
proscribing racial insults directed toward individuals in the
workplace 175 and proscribing them in a political discussion or
debate. 176 The harm to the individual victim may be the same,
but for public discourse to enable se/f-government, racist speech
within that discourse must be repudiated on the merits, rather
than be silenced by force of law.
D. Public Discourse and Harm to the Marketplace of Ideas
The most effective arguments for regulating racist speech are
those that double back on the concept of public discourse itself
and contend that such regulation is necessary for public discourse
truly to instantiate the principle of self-determination. On the
surface there appear to be two distinct lines of analysis. The
first stresses the irrational and coercive qualities of racist speech;
the second the untoward effects of racist speech in silencing
victim groups. In the end these lines of argumentation cross and
depend upon each other.
1. Racist Speech as Irrational and Coercive
Public discourse must be more than simply a register of private
preferences in order to serve as a medium for the enactment of
collective autonomy. If persons communicated in public discourse
merely through polling organizations to make known their "votes"
on public issues, democracy would degenerate into the heteron-
omous system of majoritarian rule described by Schauer. The
purposes of collective self-determination require instead that
public action be founded upon a public opinion formed through
open and interactive processes of rational deliberation. The ar-
gument that racist speech is irrational and coercive, that it is
175. See, e.g., Contreras v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 88 Wash. 2d 735, 565 P.2d 1173
(1977); Alcorn v. Anbro Eng'g, 2 Cal. 3d 493, 468 P.2d 216, 86 Cal. Rptr. 88 (1970); Love,
supra note 5, at 128-33.
176. Cf. Dominguez v. Stone, 97 N.M. 211, 638 P.2d 423 (1981) (penalizing racist speech
in political speech).
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nothing more than a kind of "linguistic abuse (verbal abuse on
an unwilling target),"'' 7 thus cuts to the very root of public
discourse.
The argument, however, points to a more general problem, for
all communication that violates civility rules is perceived as both
irrational and coercive.1'7 8 Because civility rules embody the norms
of respect and reason we are accustomed to receive from mem-
bers of our community, communication inconsistent with those
rules is experienced as an instrument "of aggression and personal
assault."'' 9 The argument from coercion and irrationality thus
poses a generic dilemma for first amendment doctrine. If the
state were permitted to enforce civility rules, it would in effect
exclude from public discourse those whose speech advocated and
exemplified unfamiliar and marginalized forms of life. But if the
state were to suspend the enforcement of civility rules, it would
endanger the possibility of rational deliberation by permitting
the dissemination of abusive and coercive speech. This tension
between the requirement that self-government respect all of its
citizens "as free and equal persons," and the requirement that
self-government proceed through processes of rational delibera-
tion, creates the paradox of public discourse. 80
It might be thought that the specific case of racist speech
dissolves this paradox, for such speech by hypothesis violates
norms of both equality and civility and hence appears to be
suppressible without harm to publiH'c discourse. But this conclusion
is not accurate. The principle of equality at issue in the paradox
of public discourse is purely formal; its extension to all persons
177. Lasson, Group Libel, supra note 5, at 122.
178. Thus "fighting words" are understood to be those that "by their very utterance
inflict injury:' Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942). Outrageous words
intentionally inflicting emotional distress are "nothing more than a surrogate" for a
"punch or kick." Wright, Hustler Magazine v. Falwell and the Role of the First Amendment,
19 CUMB. L. REV. 19, 23 (1988). "Ridicule" is experienced as a form of "intimidation."
Dewey, Creative Democracy-The Task Before Us, in CLASSIC AMERICAN PHILOSOPHERS 389,
393 (M. Fisch ed. 1951). Pornography is received not as "expression depicting the
subordination of women, but [as] the practice of subordination itself." Brest & Vandenberg,
Politics, Feminism, and the Constitution: The Anti-Pornography Movement in Minneapolis,
39 STAN. L. REV. 607, 659 (1987). And blasphemous communications are nothing more
than a form of "brawls." F. HOLT, THE LAW OF LIBEL 70-71 (1816).
179. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 412 (1967) (Fortas, J., dissenting). Alexander Bickel
once remarked that such communication "amounts to almost physical aggression." A.
BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 72 (1975); see also Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 27
(1971) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (characterizing Cohen's actions as being more like conduct
than speech).
180. See supra text accompanying notes 91-105.
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is the fundamental precondition of the possibility of self-govern-
ment. To the extent that the principle is circumscribed, so also
is the reach of self-determination. The norm of equality violated
by racist speech, on the other hand, is substantive; it reflects a
particular understanding of how we ought to live. It is the kind
of norm that ought to emerge from processes of public deliber-
ation. Although the censorship of racist speech is consistent with
this substantive norm of equality, it is inconsistent with the
formal principle of equality, because such censorship would ex-
clude from the medium of public discourse those who disagree
with a particular substantive norm of equality. Such persons
would thus be cut off from participation in the processes of
collective self-determination.
First amendment doctrine has tended to resolve the paradox
of public discourse in favor of the principle of formal equality,
largely because violations of that principle limit pro tanto the
domain of self-government, whereas protecting uncivil speech
does not automatically destroy the possibility of rational delib-
eration. The visceral shock of uncivil speech can sometimes
actually serve constructive purposes, as when it causes individ-
uals to question the community standards into which they have
been socialized and hence enables them, perhaps for the first
time, to acknowledge the claims of others from radically different
cultural backgrounds. 181 There is in fact a long tradition of op-
pressed and marginalized groups using uncivil speech to force
recognition of the intensity and urgency of their needs.18 2
Tolerating uncivil speech, moreover, does not necessarily un-
dermine the process of rational deliberation, so long as the extent
of such speech is confined and does not infect the process as a
181. Thus in Terminiello v. Chicago:
[A] function of free speech under our system of government is to invite
dispute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition
of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs
people to anger. Speech is often provocative and challenging. It may strike
at prejudices and preconceptions and have profound unsettling effects as it
presses for acceptance of an idea. That is why freedom of speech, though
not absolute . . is nevertheless protected against censorship or punishment,
unless shown likely to produce a clear and present danger of a serious
substantive evil that rises far above public inconvenience, annoyance, or
unrest. . . There is no room under our Constitution for a more restrictive
view. For the alternative would lead to standardization of ideas either by
legislatures, courts, or dominant political or community groups.
337 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1949) (citations omitted).
182. For an excellent discussion, see Karst, Boundaries and Reasons: Freedom of
Expression and the Subordination of Groups, 1990 U. ILL. L. REV. 95.
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whole. The judgment that rational deliberation can continue in
spite of the presence of uncivil speech is exactly the point of
Harlan's opinion in Cohen v. California,l'3 in which the Court
refused to permit the state to use the force of law "to maintain
.a suitable level of discourse within the body politic":'8
The constitutional right of free expression is powerful medicine
in a society as diverse and populous as ours. It is designed
and intended to remove governmental restraints from the
arena of public discussion, putting the decision as to what
views shall be voiced largely into the hands of each of us, in
the hope that use of such freedom will ultimately produce a
more capable citizenry and more perfect polity and in the belief
that no other approach would comport with the premise of
individual dignity and choice upon which our political system
rests....
To many, the immediate consequence of this freedom may
often appear to be only verbal tumult, discord, and even
offensive utterance. These are, however, within established
limits, in truth necessary side effects of the broader enduring
values which the process of open debate permits us to achieve.
That the air may at times seem filled with verbal cacophony
is, in this sense not a sign of weakness but of strength.185
It is of course a matter of judgment whether "open debate"
within "the arena of public discussion" is indeed achieving "broader
enduring values." How one makes that judgment will depend
very much on one's circumstances. The call in recent literature
to attend more carefully to "the victim's perspective"'186 is well
taken in this regard. Members of dominant groups may be sat-
isfied with the overall quality of public deliberation, but members
of victim groups, at whom racist speech is systematically tar-
geted, may feel quite otherwise.
It is at this point that the line of analysis stressing the
irrational, coercive quality of racist speech crosses and depends
upon the line of analysis stressing the silencing of victim groups.
For when pressed the point is not that public discourse is per-
vasively disabled by racist speech, but rather that the concen-
trated effect of such speech on members of victim groups is to
foreclose public discourse as an effective avenue of collective
183. 403 U.S. 15.
184. Id. at 23.
185. Id at 24-25.
186. Matsuda, supra note 5, at 2340; see Lawrence, supra note 5, at 436.
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self-determination. In the contemporary debate this effect has
been addressed under the rubric of "silencing."
2. Racist Speech as Silencing Minority Groups
The literature on silencing has burgeoned. So far as I can
make out the literature presents three distinct arguments to
support the concept of silencing:18 7 victim groups are silenced
because their perspectives are systematically excluded from the
dominant discourse;1w victim groups are silenced because the
pervasive stigma of racism systematically undermines and de-
values their speech; and victim groups are silenced because the
visceral "fear, rage, [and] shock" of racist speech systematically
preempts response. 8 9 This Section analyzes each of these argu-
ments separately; the following Section weaves them together
into a more complex indictment of racist speech.
The first argument, more developed in the context of recent
feminist literature than in that of racist speech, is that the
language of public discourse, although seemingly neutral and
objective, has a built-in bias that prevents the articulation of
minority positions. 1' ° Thus racism in the dominant discourse is
compressed into "the neutralized word 'discrimination,'" in which
"the role of power, domination, and oppression as the source of
the evil" is effaced, and "[m]uch of the political, historical, and
moral content of 'equality' has been dropped."191 Similarly, the
understanding of whites that racism is an "intentional belief in
white supremacy" - the perpetrators' perspective - has been folded
into the very language of public debate, whereas the understand-
ing of minorities that racism "'refers solely to minority subor-
dination' "-the victims' perspective-is banished from the
language. 192
Although the premise of this argument seems to me true, it
does not by itself support the conclusion that racist speech ought
187. I omit discussion of speech that silences through outright intimidation and threats.
The regulation of such speech is not problematic under any theory.
188. For a good introduction to the concept of "discourse," see Bov6, Discourse, in
CRITICAL TERMS FOR LITERARY STUDY 50 (F. Lentricchia & T. McLaughlin eds. 1990).
189. Lawrence, supra note 5, at 452.
190. Id. at 474-75; see Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and
Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1370-81 (1988).
191. Finley, Breaking Women's Silence in Law: The Dilemma of the Gendered Nature of
Legal Reasoning, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 886, 889 (1989).
192. Note, Racism and Race Relations in the University, 76 VA. L. REv. 295, 304 n.32
(1990) (quoting Brooks, Anti-Minority Mindset in the Law School Personnel Process: Toward
an Understanding of Racial Mindsets, 5 J.L. & INEQUALITY 1, 8-11 (1987)).
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to be regulated. All communication rests on foundations of un-
articulated assumptions. The very function of dialogue is often
to move toward enlightenment by uncovering and exposing these
assumptions. Enlightenment can be gradual and progressive, or
it can result from the shock of intense political struggle. That
our language always encompasses both more and less than our
intentions is thus not an argument for the suppression of racist
speech, but rather for the encouragement of further public de-
bate.
The point might be made, however, that public debate fails to
achieve such enlightenment because the pervasive racism of
American society devalues and stigmatizes minority contributions
to this debate. The voice of the victims goes unheard. There is
thus a call for an "outsider jurisprudence"'193 which will legitimate
that voice and enable "[llegal insiders . . . [to] imagine a life
disabled in a significant way by hate propaganda.' 94
Once again, the premise of this argument appears sound, but
its conclusion does not. Audiences always evaluate communication
on the basis of their understanding of its social context. 95 This
is not a deformity of public discourse, but one of its generic
characteristics. 9 6 It poses the question of how an audience's
prepolitical understanding of social context may be altered, a
question that confronts all participants in public dialogue. The
urgency of the question does not justify restricting public dis-
course; it is rather a call for more articulate and persuasive
speech, for more intense and effective political engagement.
Taken together, the argument from the inherent bias of ac-
cepted discourse and the argument from the stigmatic devaluation
of minority speech fuse into a single indictment of public dis-
course as irrational. The systematic derogation of the specific
perspectives of victim groups is said to be caused by the Nation's
particular history of racial oppression, rather than by concerns
that would properly affect a legitimately rational public dialogue.
Both arguments thus ultimately appeal to the concept of false
consciousness,' 97 to the notion that there is an ideal vantage from
193. Matsuda, supra note 5, at 2323-26.
194. Id. at 2375; see Lawrence, supra note 5, at 458-61.
195. Riesman, Democracy and Defamation: Fair Game and Fair Comment II, 42 COLUm.
L. REV. 1282, 1306-07 (1942).
196. See P. CHEVIGNY, MORE SPEECH: DIALOGUE RIGHTS AND MODERN LIBERTY 53-72
(1988); Michelman, Conceptions of Democracy in American Constitutional Argument: The
Case of Pornography Regulation, 56 TENN. L. REV. 291, 313 (1989).
197. For a general discussion of the concept of "false consciousness," see R. GEUSS,
THE IDEA OF A CRITICAL THEORY: HABERMAS AND THE FRANKFURT SCHOOL (1981).
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which the rationality of discourse can be "objectively" assessed.
But it is one thing to use the idea of false consciousness as a
weapon within public discourse to convince others of the need to
break with the prejudices of the past, and it is quite another to
use the idea as a justification to limit public discourse itself. The
first is a familiar rhetorical strategy. It is consistent with the
processes of public discourse because its effectiveness ultimately
depends upon its persuasive power. The second, however, pre-
supposes an intimacy with truth so vital as to foreclose opposing
positions. The very point of using the idea of false consciousness
to limit public discourse is to justify legally disregarding certain
perspectives, on the grounds that these perspectives could not
possibly be respected as true expressions of autonomous individ-
uality. Circumscribing public discourse to ameliorate false con-
sciousness thus does not protect public discourse from harm, but
rather contradicts its very purpose of providing a medium for
the reconciliation of autonomous wills.
The third argument for restraining racist speech does not turn
on the characterization of public discourse as irrational, but
rather as coercive. Recent literature contains searing documen-
tation of the profound personal injury of racist speech, and this
injury may in particular circumstances be so shocking as to
literally preempt responsive speech. Although the analogous harm
of uncivil speech is randomly scattered throughout the population,
the disabilities attendant upon racist speech are concentrated
upon members of victim groups. Hence, where members of dom-
inant groups perceive "isolated incidents,"''98 members of victim
groups perceive instead a suffocating and inescapable "racism
that is a persistent and constituent part of the social order,
woven into the fabric of society and everyday life."'199
Under such conditions it is to be expected that members of
dominant and victim groups may well come to conflicting judg-
ments about whether racist speech shocks significant segments
of victim group population into silence. The recent literature
proposing restraints on racist speech is eloquent on the need to
"listen[] to the real victims" of such speech and to display
"empathy or understanding for their injury."20 And of course
any fair and just determination about the regulation of public
discourse would require exactly this kind of sensitivity. But there
198. Matsuda, supra note 5, at 2331.
199. Note, supra note 192, at 295.
200. Lawrence, supra note 5, at 436.
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is also a tendency in recent literature to move from the propo-
sition that a fair determination cannot be made unless "the
victims of racist speech are heard,"' 201 to the very different
proposition that such a determination ought to use "the experi-
ence of victim-group members [as] a guide.."20 2 The latter propo-
sition seems to me plainly false.
The issue on the table is whether irrationality and coercion
have so tainted the medium of public discourse as to require
shrinking the scope of self-government. That issue significantly
affects every citizen, and its resolution therefore cannot be ceded
to the control of any particular group. In fact I do not see how
the issue can be adequately resolved at all unless some notion
of civic membership is invoked that transcends mere group iden-
tification. Unless we can strive to deliberate together as citizens,
distancing ourselves from (but not abandoning) our specific cul-
tural backgrounds, the issue can be resolved only through the
exercise of naked group power, a solution not at all advantageous
to the marginalized and oppressed.203
Paradoxically, therefore, the question of whether public dis-
course is irretrievably damaged by racist speech must itself
ultimately be addressed through the medium of public discourse.
Because those participating in public discourse will not them-
selves have been silenced (almost by definition), a heavy, frus-
201. Id. at 481.
202. Matsuda, supra note 5, at 2369. This tendency is explicitly thematized in Iris
Marion Young's artless proposal that "a democratic public" should cede to "constituent
groups that are oppressed or disadvantaged" a "veto power regarding specific policies
that affect a group directly." Young, Polity and Group Difference, 99 ETHICS 250, 261-62
(1989).
203. The "grand tradition" of republican participation, the notion that "we can lift our
public life above the fallen and compromised realm of factional politics," thus does not
seem to me so easily abandoned as would appear from recent literature stressing fidelity
to the particular cultural "tradition" of minority groups. See Lopez, The Idea of a
Constitution in the Chicano Tradition, 37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 162, 163-64 (1987). Even Young
notes that a "heterogeneous public . . . is a public, where participants discuss together
the issues before them and are supposed to come to a decision that they determine as
best or most just." Young, supra note 202, at 267.
It is possible for persons to maintain their group identity and to be influenced
by their perceptions of social events derived from their group-specific ex-
perience, and at the same time to be public spirited, in the sense of being
open to listening to the claims of others and not being concerned for their
own gain alone. It is possible and necessary for people to take a critical
distance from their own immediate desires and gut reactions in order to
discuss public proposals. Doing so, however, cannot require that citizens
abandon their particular affiliations, experiences, and social location.
Id. at 257-58.
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trating burden is de facto placed on those who would truncate
public discourse in order to save it. They must represent them-
selves as "speaking for" those who have been deprived of their
voice. But the negative space of that silence reigns inscrutable,
neither confirming nor denying this claim. And the more eloquent
the appeal, the less compelling the claim, for the more accessible
public discourse will then appear to exactly the perspectives
racist speech is said to repress.
Even if this burden is lifted, however, and it is simply accepted
that members of victim groups are intimidated into silence, it
would still not follow that restraints on racist speech within
public discourse are justified. One might believe, for example,
that such silencing occurs chiefly through the structural condi-
tions of racism, rather than specifically through the shock of
racist speech. "The problem," as the Chairman of the Black
Studies Department of New York's City College recently re-
marked apropos of the racist comments of an academic colleague,
does not lie with specific communicative acts, but rather with
"racism" itself, "insidious in our society and built into our cul-
ture.."20 4 If that were true, restraints on racist speech would
impair public discourse without at the same time repairing the
silence of victim groups.
Alternatively, one might believe that racist speech silences
victim groups primarily because of its "ideas," because of its
messages of racial inferiority, rather than because of its incivility.
The distinction is important for the following reason: although it
is consistent with the internal logic of public discourse to excise
in extreme circumstances certain kinds of uncivil speech that are
experienced as coercive, 20 5 it is fundamentally incompatible with
public discourse to excise specific ideas because they are "anal-
ogously" deemed to be coercive. Public discourse is the medium
within which our society assesses the democratic acceptability of
ideas; to exclude certain ideas as prima facie "coercive" and
hence destructive of public discourse is to contradict precisely
this function. Therefore "harm" to public discourse cannot justify
restraints on racist ideas on the grounds that such ideas are
perceived to be threatening or coercive.20 6
204. Berger, Professors' Theories on Race Stir Turmoil at City College, N.Y. Times, Apr.
20, 1990, at BI, col. 2.
205. See supra text accompanying notes 178-80.
206. Note that the argument in text does not hold against the contention that certain
ideas should be excluded from public discourse because they cause extensive harm to
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There are also other possibilities. One might believe, for ex-
ample, that because it is difficult to distinguish ideas from inci-
vility, and because it is vitally important to collective self-
determination to protect all ideas, the law will as a practical
matter be able to restrain only a small category of blatant racist
epithets, which, although deeply offensive and lacking in idea-
tional content, have relatively little to do with the more wide-
spread phenomenon of silencing. Or one might believe that racist
speech silences primarily when shocking racist epithets are used
in the face-to-face confrontations characteristic of the "fighting
words" doctrine of Chaplinsky,2 7 so that the essential insight of
the argument from silencing is already reflected within first
amendment doctrine.
My own conclusion, in light of these alternative considerations,
is that the case has not yet been made for circumscribing public
discourse to prevent the kind of preemptive silencing that occurs
when members of victim groups experience "fear, rage, [and]
shock." I say this with some hesitation, and with considerable
ambivalence. But even if the empirical claim of systematic pre-
emptive silencing were accepted (and I am not sure that I do
accept it), it is in my view most directly the result of the social
and structural conditions of racism, rather than specifically of
racist speech. Because the logic of the argument from preemptive
silencing does not impeach the necessity of preserving the free
expression of ideas,208 public discourse could at most be regulated
in a largely symbolic manner so as to purge it of outrageous
racist epithets and names. It seems to me highly implausible to
claim that such symbolic regulation will eliminate the preemptive
silencing that is said to justify restraints on public discourse.
individuals or victim groups. Such harm is extrinsic to the function of public discourse.
To evaluate the contention that public discourse ought to be limited because of harm to
individuals or groups, therefore, we must assess the importance of democratic self-
governance in light of our commitment to protecting stable personal and group identities.
See supra Sections III(B) & (C).
The argument considered in text that certain ideas ought to be excluded from public
discourse because they are intrinsically coercive, on the other hand, turns upon harm to
the function of public discourse itself. The argument is unsatisfactory because the concept
of "coercion" must itself be defined by reference to a "moral baseline" determined by
the practice in question. See A. WERTHEIIER, COERCION 217 (1987). Within the practice of
public discourse, no idea can be deemed intrinsically coercive because the very function
of public discourse presupposes a formal equality of persons and hence of ideas.
207. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
208. See supra note 206.
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3. Racist Speech as Symbolic Cultural Oppression
When distinguished and parsed in this analytic manner, there-
fore, the various arguments for restraining racist speech in order
to preserve the integrity of public discourse do not in my judg-
ment support their desired conclusion. But the arguments can be
braided together to fund an accusation more powerful than its
separate strands.
In ordinary life, members of victim groups do not experience
a string of distinct disadvantages. Rather, if representations in
the current literature are accepted as true, these groups confront
in public discourse an undifferentiated complex of circumstances
in which they are systematically demeaned, stigmatized, ignored;
in which the very language of debate resists the articulation of
their claims; in which they are harassed, abused, intimidated, and
systematically and egregiously injured both individually and col-
lectively. The question is not whether these liabilities, when
taken individually and singly, justify restraining racist speech
within public discourse, but rather whether, when taken together
as a complex whole, they render public discourse unfit as an
instrument of collective self-determination for members of victim
groups, and whether this unacceptable situation would be cured
by restraints on racist speech.
What makes this question so very formidable is that it turns
on the nexus between public discourse and the value of collective
self-determination. Although the formal preconditions of that
nexus can be described, its actual substantive realization must
remain contingent upon conditions of history, culture, and social
structure. Thus when members of victim groups claim that public
discourse no longer serves for them the value of self-government,
it is no answer to reply that they have been embraced within
its formal preconditions. If members of victim groups in fact
perceive themselves to be systematically excluded from public
dialogue, that dialogue can scarcely achieve for them those
"broader enduring values" that are its democratic justification.
The very legitimacy of democratic self-governance is thus called
into question.
The dependence of the value of public discourse upon matters
of social perception poses complex and delicate questions, but
the difficulty of these questions is profoundly magnified in the
context of the controversy over racist speech. First, the truth of
the claim that members of victim groups are cut off from mean-
ingful participation within public discourse cannot be directly
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experienced and hence evaluated by members of dominant groups.
Its resolution must therefore depend, to one degree or another,
upon acceptance of the representations of members of victim
groups. As a practical political matter, therefore, what is called
into question is not merely the truth of these representations,
but also the trust and respect with which they are received by
members of dominant groups.209 Second, the focus on trust and
respect is reinforced by the remedial claim that racist speech
ought to be censored so as to open up public discourse to victim
groups. Essentially this claim requires that self-determination be
denied to some so that it may be made available to others. Thus
society's willingness to circumscribe public discourse is trans-
formed into a touchstone of the esteem with which it regards
victim groups.
In fact it is this transformation that most precisely supports
the argument. The argument turns on the interpretive meaning
that members of victim groups ascribe to their place in American
life; the contention is that this meaning is one of exclusion. Such
an interpretation cannot be reduced to any specific empirical
claims or conditions. Instead the need of those who feel alienated
is most exactly met by a gesture of social esteem. By conveying
in the strongest possible terms messages of respect and welcome,
the censorship of racist speech might go a long way toward
allowing members of victim groups to reinterpret their experi-
ence as one of inclusion within the dialogue of public discourse.
The objection we noted earlier, that the regulation of racist
speech within public discourse could at most restrict the publi-
cation of highly offensive racist epithets and names, and that
such regulation could only serve symbolic purposes, is thus no
longer pertinent. For the argument now turns squarely on the
politics of cultural symbolism.
The most salient characteristic of such politics is that the
particular content of government regulation is less important
than its perceived meaning. We have already noted how claims
like those of individual injury or preemptive silencing define
concrete classes of communications that are said empirically to
cause a particular harm. But the claim of cultural exclusion is
fundamentally different, for it implies no such specific referent.
209. See Lawrence, supra note 5, at 474-75. That this is a general characteristic of
group claims can be seen by the development of an analogous dynamic among those who
support the regulation of pornography. See, e.g., C. MAcKINNON, On Collaboration, in
FEMNISM UNAIODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 198 (1987).
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The claim, when pressed, is not that any specific class of com-
munications actually causes members of victim groups to feel
excluded, but rather that a particular regulatory gesture will be
the occasion for members of victim groups to feel included.210
This suggests, however, that restraints on public discourse are
only one of a wide variety of strategies that government can
pursue to ameliorate the sense of cultural exclusion experienced
by victim groups. Other alternatives might include antidiscrimi-
nation laws, affirmative action programs, redistribution of eco-
nomic resources, restraints on racist forms of nonpublic speech,
and so forth. All these modifications of community life could be
interpreted as significant gestures of respect and inclusion. It is
a matter of political choice and characterization to reject these
alternatives as insufficient and to deem the limitation of public
discourse as necessary to overcome the alienation of victim groups.
At root, therefore, the argument from cultural exclusion seeks
to subordinate public discourse, whose very purpose is to serve
as the framework for all possible forms of politics, to a particular
political perspective. The argument begins with the sound prem-
ise that a cultural sense of participation is necessary for public
discourse to serve the value of collective self-determination. But
instead of conceiving public discourse as a means of rousing the
Nation's political will to actions designed to facilitate that sense
of participation, the argument instead turns on public discourse
itself, and, as a matter of political perception and assertion, deems
the limitation of that discourse to be prerequisite for the elimi-
nation of disabling alienation. The argument therefore does not
ultimately rest on the importance of protecting public discourse
from harm, but rather on the need to sacrifice public discourse
in order to recuperate profound social dislocations.
Bluntly expressed, the argument requires us to balance the
integrity of public discourse as a general structure of communi-
cation against the importance of enhancing the experience of
political participation by members of victim groups. The argu-
ment thus reiterates the position that public discourse ought to
be subordinated to the egalitarian ideals of the fourteenth amend-
210. The success or failure of the gesture will depend entirely on the perception of
members of victim groups. There is thus no guarantee that any particular regulatory
scheme will in fact actually cause members of victim groups to reinterpret their position
within public discourse. This inherent gap between regulatory design and the achievement
of regulatory purpose, coupled with the fact that only members of victim groups can
experience and evaluate the claim of cultural exclusion, creates disturbing possibilities
for strategic manipulation.
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ment. It adopts a sophisticated version of that position, however,
for it is able to contend that public discourse need be impaired
in only slight and symbolic ways. Even so minimal a gesture as
purging outrageous and shocking racist epithets could be suffi-
cient to make members of victim groups feel welcome within the
arena of public discourse, and thus to enable public discourse to
serve for them the value of self-determination 21' In this form the
argument is analogous to that advanced in the controversy over
prohibiting flag burning, in which it is also urged that public
discourse ought to be minimally impaired for highly important
symbolic reasons.2 12 Just as it has been contended that any idea
can be expressed without burning a flag,2 3 so it can be asserted
that any idea can be expressed without recourse to vile racist
epithets.21 4 In both cases, therefore, it can be argued that the de
minimis effects on public discourse are outweighed by the sig-
nificance of the interests at stake.21 5
I believe, however, that this invitation to balance ought to be
declined. This is not because balancing can be ruled out in
advance by some "absolutist" algorithm; the attraction of a purely
formal democracy may itself in extreme circumstances no longer
command limitless conviction. It is rather because, in the Amer-
ican context, the temptation to balance rests on what might be
termed the fallacy of immaculate isolation.2 16 The effect on public
211. Of course so minimal a gesture might not be sufficient to achieve this purpose.
The intrinsically speculative quality of the argument must be taken into account in its
evaluation.
212. According to the Solicitor General, the state's interest in prohibiting flag burning
turns on the importance of "safeguard[ing] the flag's identity 'as the unique and unalloyed
symbol of the Nation."' United States v. Eichman, 110 S. Ct. 2404, 2408 (1990) (quoting
Brief for United States at 28, 29).
213. Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533, 2553-54 (1989) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
214. I should be plain that I myself reject the premise of this argument and do not
believe that the rhetorical meaning of speech can be disentangled from the manner of
its presentation. Style and substance are always interdependent, for, in the words of
Georg LukAcs, "[c]ontent determines form." G. LUKAcS, REALISM IN OUR TIME: LITERATURE
AND THE CLASS STRUGGLE 19 (J. & N. Mander trans. 1962). For a discussion, see Post,
The Constitutional Concept, supra note 91, at 663 n.314. I therefore do not think that the
impact on public discourse of prohibiting certain kinds of words can ever properly be
said to be de minimis. I nevertheless want to evaluate the case for balancing on the
strong assumption of this kind of de minimis impact.
215. For a discussion of this argument in the context of flag burning, see Eichman,
110 S. Ct. at 2410-12 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
216. In evaluating this balance, I do not mean to call into question the holding of
Chaplinsky, which in my view attempts to distinguish private fracases from political
debate. See Post, The Constitutional Concept, supra note 91, at 679-81. It is clear enough
that racial epithets, when uttered in certain face-to-face situations, would constitute
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discourse is acceptable only if it is de minimis, and it is arguably
de minimis only when a specific claim is evaluated in isolation
from other, similar claims. But no claim is in practice immacu-
lately isolated in this manner. As the flag burning example
suggests, there is no shortage of powerful groups contending
that uncivil speech within public discourse ought to be "mini-
mally" regulated for highly pressing symbolic reasons. 2 17
This is evident even if the focus of analysis is narrowly limited
to the structure of the claim at issue in the debate over racist
speech. In a large heterogeneous country populated by assertive
and conflicting groups, the logic of circumscribing public discourse
to reduce political estrangement is virtually unstoppable. The
Nation is filled with those who feel displaced and who would feel
less so if given the chance symbolically to truncate public dis-
course. This is already plain in the regulations that have prolif-
erated on college campuses, which commonly proscribe not merely
speech that degrades persons on the basis of their race, but also,
to pick a typical list, speech that demeans persons on the basis
of their "color, national origin, religion, sex, sexual orientation,
age, handicap, or veteran's status.."218 The claim of de minimis
impact loses credibility as the list of claimants to special protec-
tion grows longer.
"fighting words" and hence not form part of public discourse. See Greenawalt, supra note
5, at 306. The point of the argument in text, however, is to evaluate restraints on racist
epithets in what would otherwise clearly be deemed public discourse, as for example in
political debates, newspapers, pamphlets, magazines, novels, movies, records, and so forth.
217. Anyone inclined to doubt this proposition should review again the current contro-
versy over funding for the National Endowment for the Arts, or the recent prosecutions
occasioned by the Mapplethorpe exhibition or the recordings of 2 Live Crew. See Rap
Band Members Found Not Guilty in Obscenity Trial, N.Y. Times, Oct. 21, 1990, § 1, at 1,
col. 1 (discussing 2 Live Crew's acquittal after being charged with giving obscene
performance and record store owner's conviction after being charged with selling obscene
2 Live Crew album); Cincinnati Jury Acquits Museum in Mapplethorpe Obscenity Case,
N.Y. Timeg, Oct. 6, 1990, § 1, at 1, col. 1; Reverend Wildman's War on the Arts, N.Y.
Times, Sept. 2, 1990, § 6 (Magazine), at 22, col. 1.
218. Emory University, Policy Statement on Discriminatory Harassment (1988); see Doe
v. University of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852, 856 (E.D. Mich. 1989) (concerning sanctions for
speech victimizing an individual "on the basis of race, ethnicity, religion, sex, sexual
orientation, creed, national origin, ancestry, age, marital status, handicap or Vietnam-era
veteran status"). The regulations of Michigan State University include the prohibited
category of "political persuasion." Michigan State University, Your Ticket to an Adventure
in Understanding (1988) (available from University Housing Programs). The regulations
of West Chester University include the category of "lifestyle." West Chester University,
Ram's Eye View: Every Student's Guide to West Chester University 61 (1990) (available
from Student Development Office). The regulations of Hampshire College include that of
"socio-economic class." Hampshire College, College Policies: Updates and Revisions (1988-
89).
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The point I want to press does not depend upon the intellectual
difficulty of drawing lines to separate similar claims. It is rather
that the remedial and political logic of equal participation applies
with analogous force to a broad and growing spectrum of group
claims. One might, of course, devise arguments, perhaps based
on the specific history of the fourteenth amendment, to distin-
guish racial epithets from blasphemous imprecations, or from
degrading and pornographic characterizations of women, or from
vicious antigay slurs, or from gross ethnic insults. But the ques-
tion is whether such arguments can withstand the compelling
egalitarian logic that unites these various situations. My strong
intuition is that they cannot, and hence that the claim of de
minimis impact on public discourse is implausible.2 19
In the specific context of the argument from cultural exclusion,
moreover, a refusal to balance is far less harsh than it might
superficially appear. The fundamental challenge is to enable mem-
bers of victim groups to reinterpret their experience within the
American political and cultural order as one of genuine partici-
pation. There are a host of ways to address this challenge short
of truncating public discourse. The most obvious and potentially
effective strategy would be to dismantle systematically and force-
fully the structural conditions of racism. If we were so blessed
as to be able to accomplish that feat-if we were truly able to
eliminate such conditions as chronic unemployment, inadequate
health care, segregated housing, or disproportionately low in-
comes-then we would no doubt also have succeeded in amelio-
rating the experience of cultural exclusion.
IV. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND HARM TO THE EDUCATIONAL
ENVIRONMENT
If public discourse is bounded on one side by the necessary
structures of community life, it is bounded on the other by the
need of the state to create organizations to achieve explicit public
objectives. These organizations, which are nonpublic forums, reg-
ulate speech in ways that are fundamentally incompatible with
the requirements of public discourse. 220 Public discourse is the
219. This claim is also implausible, as I noted earlier, because of its vulnerable
assumption that style can be sharply distinguished from substance. See supra note 214.
220. The argument in this and the following two paragraphs is developed in detail in
Post, Between Governance and Management: The History and Theory of the Public Forum,
34 UCLA L. REv. 1713 (1987) [hereinafter Post, Between Governance]. See also Post, The
Constitutional Concept, supra note 91, at 684-85.
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medium through which our democracy determines its purposes,
and for this reason the legal structure of public discourse requires
that all such purposes be kept open to question and reevaluation.
Within nonpublic forums, on the other hand, government objec-
tives are taken as established, and communication is regulated
as necessary to achieve those objectives.
Although the Supreme Court has often held that "the First
Amendment rights of speech and association extend to the cam-
puses of state universities," and even that "the campus of a
public university, at least for its students, possesses many of the
characteristics of a public forum," 221 in fact state institutions of
higher learning are public organizations established for the ex-
press purpose of education. The Court has always held that "a
university's mission is education" and has never construed the
first amendment to deny a university's "authority to impose
reasonable regulations compatible with that mission upon the use
of its campus and facilities."2 2 The Court has explicitly recognized
"a university's right to exclude .. .First Amendment activities
that . .. substantially interfere with the opportunity of other
students to obtain an education. '' 2?- Thus student speech incom-
patible with classroom processes may be censored; faculty pub-
lications inconsistent with academic standards may be evaluated
and judged; and so forth.
The regulation of racist speech within public institutions of
higher learning, therefore, does not turn on the value of demo-
cratic self-governance and its realization in public discourse.
Instead the constitutionality of such regulation depends upon the
logic of instrumental rationality, and specifically upon three fac-
tors: (1) the nature of the educational mission of the university;
(2) the instrumental connection of the regulation to the attainment
of that mission; and (3) the deference that courts ought to display
toward the instrumental judgment of institutional authorities.22
The current controversy regarding the constitutionality of reg-
ulating racist speech on university and college campuses may
most helpfully be interpreted as a debate about the first of these
factors, the constitutionally permissible educational objectives of
public institutions of higher learning.225
221. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267 n.5, 268-69 (1981).
222. Id. at 268 n.5.
223. Id. at 277 (citing Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 189 (1972)).
224. Judicial application of these factors in nonpublic fora like universities is discussed
in greater detail in Post, Between Governance, supra note 220, at 1765-1824.
225. This short discussion considers only issues pertaining to the constitutionality of
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Courts have advanced at least three different concepts of those
objectives. The most traditional concept, which I refer to as "civic
education," views public education as an instrument of community
life, and holds "that respect for constituted authority and obe-
dience thereto is an essential lesson to qualify one for the duties
of citizenship, and that the schoolroom is an appropriate place to
teach that lesson. '2 6 Civic education conceptualizes instruction
as a process of cultural reproduction, whereby community values
are authoritatively handed down to the young. The validity of
those values is largely taken for granted, and there is a strong
tendency to use them as a basis for the regulation of speech in
the manner of the traditional common law.
The concept of civic education held sway in the years before
the Warren Court and has recently been forcefully resurrected
with regard to the regulation of speech within high schools. Thus
in Bethel School District No. 408 v. Fraser22 the Court upheld
the punishment of a high school student for having delivered an
"offensive" and "indecent" student-government speech.2 8 The
Court reasoned that "the objectives of public education" included
"the 'inculcat[ion of] fundamental values necessary to the main-
tenance of a democratic political system.' "229 Among these values
were "the habits and manners of civility as . . . indispensable to
the practice of self-government."' ' 0
The undoubted freedom to advocate unpopular and controver-
sial views in schools and classrooms must be balanced against
the society's countervailing interest in teaching students the
boundaries of socially appropriate behavior....
.. . [S]chools must teach by example the shared values of
a civilized social order. . . . The schools, as instruments of the
state, may determine that the essential lessons of civil, mature
conduct cannot be conveyed in a school that tolerates lewd,
indecent, or offensive speech and conduct such as that indulged
in by this confused boy.2 1'
the regulation of racist speech. It does not consider the educational issues raised by such
regulation. These issues are, however, profound and revolve around the question of
whether legal restraint is the heuristically most effective response to racist speech.
226. Pugsley v. Sellmeyer, 158 Ark. 247, 253, 250 S.W. 538, 539 (1923).
227. 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
228. Id. at 678.
229. Id. at 681 (quoting Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 77 (1979)).
230. Id. (quoting C. BEARD & M. BEARD, NEW BASIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES
228 (1968)).
231. Id. at 681, 683. For a more recent example of the same kind of reasoning, see
Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271-72 (1988).
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That the concept of civic education would lead to similar
conclusions if applied to institutions of higher learning is evi-
denced by Chief Justice Burger's 1973 dissent in Papish v. Uni-
versity of Missouri Curators: 2
In theory, at least, a university is not merely an arena for the
discussion of ideas by students and faculty; it is also an insti-
tution where individuals learn to express themselves in ac-
ceptable, civil terms. We provide that environment to the end
that students may learn the self-restraint necessary to the
functioning of a civilized society and understand the need for
those external restraints to which we must all submit if group
existence is to be tolerable.m
Because racist speech is both deeply uncivil and contrary to
"the shared values of [our] civilized social order," its restraint
would be relatively unproblematic if civic education were under-
stood to constitute a constitutionally acceptable purpose of public
institutions of higher learning.2 5 A number of public universities
have fashioned their regulations on exactly this understanding.
For example, the Policy Against Racism of the Board of Regents
of Higher Education of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts
argues that "institutions must vigorously strive to achieve diver-
sity in race, ethnicity, and culture sufficiently reflective of our
society. However, diversity alone will not suffice":
There must be a unity and cohesion in the diversity which we
seek to achieve, thereby creating an environment of pluralism.
Racism in any form, expressed or implied, intentional or in-
advertent, individual or institutional, constitutes an egregious
offense to the tenets of human dignity and to the accords of
civility guaranteed by law. Consequently, racism undermines
the establishment of a social and academic environment of
genuine racial pluralism. 6
The policy clearly postulates the fundamental task of the univer-
sity to be the inculcation of the value of "genuine racial plural-
232. 410 U.S. 667 (1973).
233. Id. at 672 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
234. Bethel v. School Dist. No. 403 v. Frazer, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986).
235. For the development of this logic at the pre-university level, see, for example,
Clarke v. Board of Educ., 215 Neb. 250, 338 N.W.2d 272 (1983).
236. Commonwealth of Massachusetts Board of Regents of Higher Education, Policy
Against Racism and Guidelines for Campus Policies Against Racism 2 (June 13, 1989).
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ism," and it proscribes racist speech because of its incompatibility
with that value.
A second concept of the mission of public education, which I
refer to as "democratic education," begins with the very different
premise that the "public school" is "in most respects the cradle
of our democracy,"' 7 and it therefore understands the purpose
of public education to be the creation of autonomous citizens,
capable of fully participating in the rough and tumble world of
public discourse.m Democratic education strives to introduce that
world into the generically more sheltered environment of the
school.
The concept of democratic education was most fully expressed
during the era of the Warren Court in Tinker v. Des Moines
School District,29 in which the Court held that the purpose of
public education is to prepare students for the "sort of hazardous
freedom . . . that is the basis of our national strength and of the
independence and vigor of Americans who grow up and live in
this relatively permissive, often disputatious, society."2 40 The
majority in Tinker explicitly rejected the premise of civic edu-
cation that the purpose of public schooling is the transmission of
canonical values. It concluded instead that "[i]n our system, state-
operated schools may not be enclaves of totalitarianism ...
[S]tudents may not be regarded as closed-circuit recipients of
only that which the [s]tate chooses to communicate. They may
not be confined to the expression of those sentiments that are
officially approved." 241 According to Tinker the object of public
education is to lead students to think for themselves.
The chief characteristic of democratic education is its tendency
to assimilate speech within public educational institutions to a
model of public discourse. Recognizing that this ambition is "not
without its costs in terms of the risk to the maintenance of
civility and an ordered society," the Court nevertheless strongly
advanced the concept of democratic education during the late
237. Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 508 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting). For a
fully developed statement of this position, see Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374
U.S. 203, 241-42 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring).
238. The tension between the concepts of democratic and civic education closely
recapitulates the informative debate between Piaget and Durkheim over the question of
how to teach moral values. Durkheim stressed the importance of discipline, authority,
and constraint, whereas Piaget emphasized cooperation, agreement, and autonomy. See
J. PIAGET, supra note 84, at 341-71.
239. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
240. Id. at 508-09.
241. Id at 511.
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1960's and early 1970's, in part because it believed the concept
essential to the maintenance of "our vigorous and free society."242
If, as I have argued, racist speech is and ought to be immune
from regulation within public discourse, we can expect courts
guided by the concept of democratic education to be quite hostile
to the regulation of racist speech within universities, preferring
instead to see students realistically prepared for participation in
the harsh but inevitable world of public discourse.
There is yet a third concept of public education, one most often
specifically associated with institutions of higher learning. This
concept, which I refer to as "critical education," views the uni-
versity as an institution whose distinctive "primary function" is
"to discover and disseminate knowledge by means of research
and teaching."243 Critical education locates the principal prereq-
uisite for university life in "the need for unfettered freedom, the
right to think the unthinkable, discuss the unmentionable, and
challenge the unchallengeable.."244
[I]f a university is a place for knowledge, it is also a special
kind of small society. Yet it is not primarily a fellowship, a
club, a circle of friends, a replica of the civil society outside
it. Without sacrificing its central purpose, it cannot make its
primary and dominant value the fostering of friendship, soli-
darity, harmony, civility, or mutual respect. To be sure, these
are important values; other institutions may properly assign
them the highest, and not merely a subordinate priority; and
a good university will seek and in some significant measure
attain these ends. But it will never let these values, important
as they are, override its central purpose. We value freedom
of expression precisely because it provides a forum for the
new, the provocative, the disturbing, and the unorthodox. Free
speech is a barrier to the tyranny of authoritarian or even
majority opinion as to the rightness or wrongness of particular
doctrines or thoughts.245
The university as the purveyor of critical education serves
important social purposes. These include not only the disciplined
242. Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 194 (1972).
243. Report of the Committee on Freedom of Expression at Yale, 4 HuM. RTs. 357, 357
(1975) [hereinafter Report of the Committee]. This function is not one that we ordinarily
attribute to high schools, much less elementary schools.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 357-58; see Schmidt, Freedom of Thought: A Principle in Peril?, YALE ALUMNI
MAG., Oct. 1989, at 65, 65-66.
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pursuit of truth, but also the exemplary enactment of a "model
of expression that is meaningful as well as free, coherent yet
diverse, critical and inspirational."' ' 6 The concept of critical ed-
ucation has strong affinities to the traditional "marketplace of
ideas" theory of the first amendment, and it is not uncommon
for courts who use the concept to speak of the "classroom" as
"peculiarly the 'marketplace of ideas,' deserving of protection
because the "Nation's future depends upon leaders trained through
wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which discovers
truth 'out of a multitude of tongues, [rather] than through any
kind of authoritative selection.' "247
The concept of critical education differs significantly from both
civic and democratic education. In contrast to civic education, it
rejects the notion of canonical values that are to be reproduced
in the young. Hence public universities committed to critical
education are not free to posit certain values (apart from the
value of critical education itself) and to punish those who disagree.
The logic of critical education would constitutionally require that
a public university "not restrict speech . . . simply because it
finds the views expressed by any group to be abhorrent."24 8 This
stands in stark contrast to the educational project of institutions
like the University of Massachusetts, Mount Holyoke, Marquette,
or Mary Washington,249 which are committed to the mission of
civic education.
The concept of critical education would also sharply limit the
ability of universities to censor uncivil speech. Speech can be
uncivil for many reasons, including the assertion of ideas that
are perceived to be offensive, revolting, demeaning, and stigma-
tizing. Critical education, however, would require the toleration
246. Byrne, Academic Freedom: A "Special Concern of the First Amendment," 99 YALE
L.J. 251, 261 (1989). The presence of such a model
contributes profoundly to society at large. We employ the expositors of
academic speech to train nearly everyone who exercises leadership within
our society. Beyond whatever specialized learning our graduates assimilate,
they ought to be persuaded that careful, honest expression demands an
answer in kind. The experience of academic freedom helps secure broader,
positive liberties of expression.
Id.
247. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (quoting United States v.
Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943)); see Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169,
180-81 (1972).
248. Healy, 408 U.S. at 187-88.
249. See supra, notes 47-51 and accompanying text.
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of all ideas, however uncivil.2 ° This toleration would be consistent
with the Court's 1973 holding that "the mere dissemination of
ideas-no matter how offensive to good taste-on a state uni-
versity campus may not be shut off in the name alone of 'con-
ventions of decency.' ",251
Critical education also differs in important respects from dem-
ocratic education. The telos of critical education lies in the pursuit
of truth, rather than in the instantiation of the responsible
autonomy of the citizen. The pursuit of truth requires not only
an unfettered freedom of ideas, but also honesty, fidelity to
reason, and respect for method and procedures. Reason, as we
have seen, carries its own special requirements of civility, which
preclude coercion and abuse.2 2 Although enforcement of these
requirements and values would be inconsistent with democratic
education, it may well be required by critical education. Moreover
critical education requires freedom of ideas only with respect to
that speech which forms part of the truth-seeking dialogue of.
the university. Thus, for example, nothing in the concept of
critical education would prevent a university from penalizing
malicious racist speech communicated solely for the purpose of
harassing, humiliating, or degrading a victim. 25 The trick, of
course, would be to distinguish such speech in a manner that
does not chill communication intended to form part of a truth-
seeking exchange.2 This represents a formidable technical chal-
lenge, for it is all too easy to permit revulsion with the content
of speech to infect regulation ostensibly justified by other rea-
sons.
255
Although there is not space in this short essay to engage in a
full-scale exploration of the purposes of higher education, some
conclusions are clear enough. The Constitution would not permit
a public university, in the name of civic education, to prohibit
250. "If the university's overriding commitment to free expression is to be sustained,
secondary social and ethical responsibilities must be left to the informal processes of
suasion, example, and argument." Report of the Committee, supra note 243, at 360.
251. Papish v. University of Mo. Curators, 410 U.S. 667, 670 (1973).
252. See supra Section III(D)(1).
253. As a matter of policy, however, it is always dangerous to make the legality of
speech depend primarily upon an assessment of a speaker's intent, for there is a powerful
tendency to attribute bad motives to those with whom we fundamentally disagree.
254. The inability to make this distinction contributed to a court's recent decision to
strike down as unconstitutional the regulations of the University of Michigan. See Doe v.
University of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989); Grano, supra note 5, at 7.
255. For an admirable attempt to meet this challenge, see Grey, supra note 5, and the
regulations that Professor Grey drafted for Stanford University.
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the teaching of communism' because of its conflict with community
values. Nor would the Constitution, in the name of democratic
education, preclude a public university from enforcing regulations
against highly offensive racial epithets within a classroom.
Examples like these incline me toward the concept of critical
education, yet the extent to which state universities ought con-
stitutionally to be required to pursue one or the other of these
educational missions does not seem to me without difficulties.2 96
The analysis is complicated by the possibility that public univer-
sities may have various educational functions with constitution-
ally distinct characteristics. Thus it is conceivable that public
universities may be permitted to pursue the mission of civic
education within their dormitories, but be required to follow the
requirements of democratic education with regard to their open
spaces.2 7 These are matters that require further and careful
consideration.
I conclude, therefore, by stressing two brief points. First, the
constitutionality of restraints on racist speech within public uni-
versities does not depend upon the constitutionality of such
regulation within public discourse. Second, the constitutionality
of restraints on racist speech within public universities will
depend to a very great extent upon the educational purposes
that we constitutionally attribute to public institutions of higher
learning, and upon the various modalities through which such
institutions are understood to pursue those purposes. We ought
to see debate turn toward the achievement of a fuller and more
reflective comprehension of these questions.
V. CONCLUSION: THE QUESTION OF FORMAL DEMOCRACY
This account of the constitutionality of university restrictions
on racist speech suggests that a principal flaw of the contempo-
rary debate has been its pervasive assumption that the relation-
ship of racist speech to the first amendment can be assessed
256. Cases like Tinker and Healy make clear, however, that the Supreme Court's first
amendment jurisprudence has rested on the assumption that there are constitutional
limits to the freedom of public educational institutions to define their own educational
mission.
257. Some universities have regulated racist speech in ways that turn on similar
functional and geographic considerations. See Doe, 721 F. Supp. at 856; Tufts Restores
Free Speech After T-Shirt Confrontation, San Francisco Chron., Dec. 9, 1989, at B6, col. 1;
Wilson, Colleges Take 2 Basic Approaches in Adopting Anti-Harassment Plans, Chron.
Higher Educ., Oct. 4, 1989, at A38, col. 1; Russo, Free Speech at Tufts: Zoned Out, N.Y.
Times, Sept. 27, 1989, at A29.
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independently of social context. Communication, however, does
not form a constitutionally undifferentiated terrain. The stan-
dards of first amendment protection afforded to public discourse
will not be the same as those applied to nonpublic speech, and
these in turn will differ from those that govern the regulation
of speech within instrumental governmental institutions like uni-
versities. The concrete circumstances of racist speech thus figure
prominently in the constitutional equation.
Public discourse is the realm of communication we deem nec-
essary to facilitate the process of self-determination. As that
process is open-ended, reflecting the boundless possibility of
social self-constitution, so we fashion public discourse to be as
free from legal constraint as is feasible to sustain. But as self-
determination requires the antecedent formation of a "self'
through socialization into the particularity of a given community
life, so public discourse must at some point be bounded by
nonpublic speech, in which community values are embodied and
enforced. And as the decisions of a self-determining democracy
require actual implementation, so public discourse must at some
other point be bounded by the instrumentally regulated speech
of the nonpublic forum.
I have attempted to explain the unique protections that Amer-
ican first amendment jurisprudence affords to public discourse
through a self-consciously formal analysis; that is, I have at-
tempted to uncover the formal prerequisites for the instantiation
of the value of democracy as self-determination. Although this
kind of formal analysis has the advantage of forcing us to clearly
articulate the values in whose name we purport to act, it has
the disadvantage of obscuring the messy complications of the
world. Formal analysis is always subject to the critique that
actual, substantive conditions have undermined its very point
and meaning.
From a formal perspective, democracy fulfills the purposes of
autonomous self-government because we accept an image of in-
dependent citizens deliberating together to form public opinion.
We therefore structure constitutional policy according to the
requirements of that image. But it is an image blatantly vulner-
able to the most forceful empirical attack.25 Citizens are not
autonomous; they are manipulated by the media, coerced by
private corporations, immured in the toils of racism. Citizens do
258. See, e.g., E. PURCELL, THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY: SCIENTIFIC NATURALISM
AND THE PROBLEM OF VALUE (1973).
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not communicate together; they are passive, irrational, and voice-
less. Deliberation is impossible because of the technical and
economic structure of the mass media; public opinion is therefore
imposed upon citizens rather than spontaneously arising from
them. The very aspiration to self-determination reinforces pre-
existing inequalities by empowering those with the resources and
competence to take advantage of democratic processes; it syste-
matically handicaps socially marginalized groups who lack this
easy and familiar access to the media of democratic deliberation.
And so forth: the litany is by now depressingly familiar.
Of course these criticisms, and others like them, contain im-
portant elements of truth. They therefore force us to choose:
either we decide to retain the ideal of democracy as deliberative
self-determination and work to minimize the debilitating conse-
quences of these criticisms, or we decide that these criticisms
have so undermined the ideal of deliberative self-determination
that it must be abandoned and a different value for democracy
embraced. If we choose the second alternative, we have the
responsibility of articulating and defending a new vision of de-
mocracy. But if we choose the first, we have the responsibility
of working to foster the constitutional values upon which we
rely. We have the obligation of doing so, however, in ways that
do not themselves contravene the necessary preconditions of the
ideal of deliberative self-determination.2 59 The function of formal
analysis is to make clear the content of that obligation.
The strict implication of this essay, then, is not that racist
speech ought not to be regulated in public discourse, but rather
that those who advocate its regulation in ways incompatible with
the value of deliberative self-governance carry the burden of
moving us to a different and more attractive vision of democracy.
Or, in the alternative, they carry the burden of justifying sus-
pensions of our fundamental democratic commitments. Neither
burden is light.
259. For a striking illustration of the untoward (and in retrospect horrifying) conse-
quences of repudiating that obligation, see Marcuse, Repressive Tolerance, in R. WOLFF,
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